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Abstract 
The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a new development initiative with a 
stated aim to "eradicate poverty in Africa and place African countries both individually and 
collectively on a path of sustainable growth and development to thus halt the marginalisation of 
Africa in the globalisation process". 1 
This study will critically explore the historical context of NEPAD. It will take the form of an 
investigation into the history of Africa's economic trends since Independenee2 and the collective 
actions to address the development problems. In particular, the United Nations (UN) and World 
Bank plans and initiatives will be compared to Africa's own collective response. 
NEPAD is preceded by a series of donor-led and African-initiated development efforts. 
Essentially, the previous developments have been unsuccessful in as much as they have failed to 
lift Africa out of its development crisis. There are a plethora of explanations that account for this 
situation. A central objective of this paper is to trace these past initiatives, to draw out the key 
characteristics of their development agendas and to analyse the core reasons for their failure. 
Further, this paper seeks to highlight the points of difference between the initiatives and 
especially between NEPAD and its predecessors. It aims to assess the extent to which NEPAD 
responds to past failures and calls for change in the focus of development initiatives. 
I NEP AD update. 02 May 2002. p.2. www.dfa.gov.za 
'Independence' is used to in this context to describe the period in African history that followed from the 
decolonisation of its land and peoples. 
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Introduction 
This study seeks to explore the historical context of NEPAD. It will set out the history of 
Africa's economic trends and development needs since Independence. It will analyse the extent 
to which foreign-crafted and African-led development initiatives have reversed the economic 
decay in the continent and responded to these development needs. A comparison will be made 
between UN and World Bank plans and Africa's own collective response. This will lead to a 
discussion of the extent to which NEPAD differs from previous efforts. In tum, this will raise a 
debate in the conclusion of this paper regarding the relevance of NEPAD in light of Africa's 
development dynamics. 
The purpose of this introduction is twofold. Firstly, the main concepts used in this study will be 
introduced and defined; secondly, the analytical framework will be outlined. The introduction is 
thus organised in several brief sections: section (a) will discuss the significance of development 
efforts in Africa. The term 'development' will be defined within a discussion highlighting the 
divergence in its conceptions, and the implications this has; section (b) will outline the design of 
this study; and, finally, section (c) will give an overview of the organisation of this study. 
(a) The Significance of Development Strategies in Africa 
Despite its wealth in resources, Africa remains the poorest continent in the world, with almost 
half of all Africans living on less than USSI I day. While it only accounts for 10% of the world's 
popUlation, the continent holds over 30% of the world's poor. According to the lJN's 
classification of development, 80% of the world's least developed countries are found in Africa. 3 
Poverty is rising in terms of numbers of individuals who fall into this bracket and in terms of 
Africa's share in the world's absolute poor, which in the 1990's increased from 25% to 30%.4 
The quality of life in Africa is low relative to the rest of the world. Life expectancy is about 54 
years. The infant mortality rate stands at about 140 deaths per 1000 births, one third of African 
children are malnourished and almost half the population does not have access to safe water. In 
, Matthews, S .. and Solomon, H., 'Prospects for African Development in Light of The New Partnership for Africa's 
Development (NEPAD),. Monograph Series, Briefing Paper. No. 3/2002, ww\v.ai.org.za 
-I Pahad. A .. 'The New Partnership for Africa's Development'. in Gibb, R .. Hughes, T., Mills. G., and Vaahtoranta, 
T .• (eds,), Charting a New Course: Globalisation. African Recovery andthe New Africa Initiative. The South African 
Institute of International Affairs. Johannesburg, South Africa, 2002, p,3 
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addition, Africa accounts for 70% of the total number of HIV infected persons. 5 This 
development crisis in Africa has an array of causes - from the history of destructive foreign 
interventions to the complexity of the continents own socio-economic terrain. The different 
conceptions of the causes of Africa's underdevelopment are closely linked to the different 
conceptions of which development strategies are best suited to Africa. 
Since World War Two development has been largely conceived of by governments and 
multilateral institutions as synonymous with economic growth. Africa's underdevelopment was 
conceived of largely as an economic problem. Economics was seen as the cause and thus the 
remedy was held up to be economic growth, with trends in income per capita taken as the 
primary indicator of the rate of progress. Poverty was seen as the inability of people to meet their 
basic material needs, through lack of money and buying power. By categorising countries within 
low, lower middle-, middle- or upper- income brackets, it may be argued that the World Bank 
reports demonstrate this emphasis on development as a material condition. This reading has 
raised a series of questions regarding the nature, causes and objectives of development as well as 
the theoretical adequacy, empirical validity and the value of the World Bank's assumptions and 
models. 
Essentially, such orthodox theories of development and economic growth proved inadequate for 
Africa. For example, development conceptions that saw Africa's export sector as the engine of 
growth and which therefore prescribed that Africa should increase exports, proved fundamentally 
flawed. Such a strategy floundered in the face of adverse terms of trade and the instability of 
export trade. More particularly, it was marred by: the relatively low elasticity of demand for 
agricultural export products; the fact that for many export products, such as beverages; the 
volume of consumption is habit-determined; the shift in importers' consumption patterns in 
favour of consumer durables; the emergence of synthetic substitutes for primary commodity 
exports; and falling export prices. Even if Africa did improve its production for export, the 
success of the strategy would still be limited by external factors. Furthermore, the emphasis that 
orthodox development theories place on import-substitution industrialisation as a means to 
reduce the dependence of Africa on the international economy has, in many ways, had the reverse 
effect. Rather than achieving this goal, import intensive activity increasingly entrenched 
dependence, especially given the need for immediate capital goods from abroad to sustain 
, Matthews. S., and Solomon, H., 'Prospects for African Development in Light of The New Partnership for Africa's 
Development NEPAD)" Monograph Series, Briefing Paper No. 3/2002. www.ai.org.za 
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production. This had the effect of making the African economy vulnerable to a decline in the 
availability of foreign exchange.6 Additionally, economic growth under such a strategy was 
constrained by the small size of the domestic markets. 
Through the 1970's, the orthodox theories of development and economic growth came to be 
criticised on logical, moral, political and historical grounds. In particular, radical economists 
such as Andre Gunder Frank7 and Michael Todaro8 asserted the need for social justice and 
human satisfaction to be included as essential components within any conception of 
development. Such thinking was instrumental in the rise of an intellectual revolt against the 
"trickle down" theories of development, which held that growth alone was the answer. Drawing 
on historical evidence, it was argued that even if increased output of goods and services was 
achieved, it failed to trickle down to the poorest in populations. Analyses of the distribution of 
gains on a global and domestic scale showed increasing economic differentiation between and 
within countries. While the focus on economic development in development policy was 
founded on the belief that a trickle down process would bring benefits to the majority, it became 
increasingly clear that this mechanism failed to work. This change in mindset away from the 
orthodox model is reflected by the writings of the former World Bank President, Robert 
McNamara who, in a 1973 publication of the journal 'Foreign Policy' claimed "that we need 
development policies which benefit all strata of the population and not just a favoured 
. . ,,9 
mmonty. 
Conceptions of the causes of Africa's underdevelopment dilemma increasingly began to shift 
with the mounting critique of orthodox development theories. In Africa especially, 
underdevelopment increasingly came to be seen not as a consequence of economics alone but 
more as a consequence of the continent's dependence on external actors and resources. Thus, in 
Africa, this period of rethinking about 'development' was marked by efforts pushing for national 
and collective self-reliance and self-sustaining development as part of a move towards a more 
holistic rendition of the term. to Seeing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as one of the most 
(, Krueger. A.O .. 'Import Substitution Versus Export Promotion' in Finance and Development. 2. 1985. p.21 
7 Frank. G.A., 'The Development of Underdevelopment'. in Crockroft. J.D .. Frank. G.A .. Johnson. D.L., 
Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy. New York. 1972, pp.8-9 
S Todaro. M.P., Economics for a Developing World: An introduction to Principles. Problems and Policies for 
Development. 1977, London. p.98 
l) Grant. J.P .. 'Development: The End of Trickle-Down'?' in Foreign Policy. 12. Fall 1973, pA3 
III Comparison can be drawn here to the thinking of earlier development economists such as Mydral 
Mydra1. H., Asia Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. London. Allen Lane. New York, Patheon, 1968 
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pervasive of "development illusions"!!, the then Executive Secretary of the Economic 
Commission for Africa, Adebayo Adedeji, described Africa's needs as not simply growth but 
"complete restructuring and transfonnation of its political economies from dependent to self 
reliant ones.,,12 This would, for example, involve: the internalisation of the forces of demand 
that detennine the direction of development and economic growth processes and patterns of 
output; increasing the substitution of inputs derived from within the system for those derived 
from outside; and increasing the participation of the mass of the people in the production and 
consumption. Self-reliance and self-sustainability imply the capacity and capability to make 
indigenous resources the stimuli for development and economic growth and for creating self-
renewing economies and societies. Thus, instead of criteria for development being externally 
defined they would be detennined by internal needs. 
Importantly, this period of rethinking about 'development', in which orthodox theories were 
debunked both because of their unproblematic conception of the cause(s) of underdevelopment 
and because of the negative effects of their practical application, was inextricably linked with the 
promotion of the concept of a collective framework within which Africa could fonnulate and 
implement policies and strategies for its own development. On this point, Adedeji declares that: 
" ... African countries cannot continue to pursue economic policies and strategies as if all they 
want to be is a poor imitation of America, France, England, USSR or China ... the time has come 
for us to think seriously about evolving a genuinely authentic strategy for development - a 
strategy for development that is not externally orientated, that is not based on copying other 
societies hook, line and sinker, and that does not lead to acculturative modernization.,,13 
Responding to the inadequacies of the orthodox approaches to development, the United Nations 
Development Programme (Ul'JDP) developed the Human Development Index in 1990 to measure 
the development achievements of individual countries in tenns of life expectancy, education, and 
average purchasing power. This results in a different evaluation of different countries' 
perfonnance to those attained through more orthodox methods of measurement. Additional to 
UN-led alternatives, the last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed a proliferation of 
J! Adedji. A .. Presidential Address to the 1972 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, mimeograph 
1CAdedji. A, Statement to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Second Regular session. 12 July 
197, Geneva 
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debates about what constitutes development from civil society groups such as Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), grass root development organisations, private foundations 
and individuals. 
Concurrent with the escalation of such debates, calls to empower local communities along a 
more needs and rights based focus have also arisen. They have been realised to the extent that 
the mainstream development debate has shifted from a purely growth based conception to one 
that advocates 'sustainable development'. This shift began in the late 1980's with the 
publication of the Brundtland Report by the Brundtland Commission. This was further 
entrenched in development thinking by ensuing global summits such as the UNCED/Rio Summit 
in June 1992, the UN World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in March 1995, and 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 2002. , Sustainable 
development' continues to push further growth within a global free market economy as the 
solution to development problems. However, it emphasises that development should not be 
pursued at the expense of future generations or the ecological/environmental resource base. This 
new emphasis is based on the belief that growth within the free market economy will free up 
resources that can be used to benefit the environment and social progress. 
The World Bank has responded to these developments and criticisms of its policies in several 
ways. For example, in line with the rise of post-modernist theory, it has included a series of 
rights-based guidelines. The implication is that these inform policy. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) too, has taken steps in a similar direction as demonstrated by the development of its 
Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative and a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, 
which are designed to allow for the reduction in the debt burden of the poorest states. There is, 
therefore, some kind of move away from orthodox growth centred conceptions of development 
by the international financial institutions (IFls). However, despite the infusion of post 
modernism and rights-orientated conceptions of development, which will be discussed in more 
detail later, it is argued here that the growth-centred model and the neo-liberal mindset continue 
to underpin development policies. 
A central dilemma in the debate over how development should be conceived and pursued is that 
since Independence the main drivers of development policies have been the IFIs, particularly the 
J1 Adedji. A., 'Development and Economic Growth in Africa to the year 2000: Alternative Projections and Policies', 
in Sha\v Timothey M., (cd.), Alternative Future for Africa, Boulder. Colorado. Westview Press. 1982, p.279 
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World Bank and the IMF. Significantly, these are based in Washington D.C and are staffed 
largely by economists who are products of the western system of education. Historically, these 
institutions are guided by the neo-liberal paradigm of development that places emphasis on 
economic growth, the market and profit-driven development. Although created in the climate of 
post World War Two Europe to assist in its reconstruction and development, these institutions 
have come to playa pivotal role in a different form of development to the one on which their 
establishment was premised, and one that is also further a field. Africa's development attempts 
are historically a product of or dependent upon support by these institutions. In light of this, a 
core objective of this paper is to assess how the IFIs have over time conceived of development, 
and how these and their development initiatives relate and compare to Africa's collective action 
plans. 
(b) The Design of This Study 
NEP AD is a recent development initiative. Given this, there are a number of pitfalls that this 
study seeks to avoid, such as making predictions regarding its success and future. Rather than 
offering a normative study on NEPAD, the aim here is to offer a literature-based review of its 
historical context using both primary and secondary sources. While there is a wealth of 
secondary source, journalistic material regarding NEPAD, given its infancy there is relatively 
little published academic reference material. This study seeks to critically evaluate the media 
sources and to locate them within a more grounded academic study that draws upon a variety of 
international relations and development theories. Comparative analysis will be employed to 
assess development initiatives and policies vis-a-vis each other. After tracing and analysing the 
development initiatives, this study subsequently explores the extent to which NEP AD is in line 
with the indigenous African development agenda that places emphasis on self-sustainability, and 
the extent to which it is in linc with the Development Merchant System (DMS), which is largely 
represented by the World Bank along with the other major IFIs. This demands further analysis of 
what constitutes indigenous African development theory. Further, it calls for an investigation 
into the alleged shift in the development policies of the DMS away from an economic growth 
and nco-liberal focus in their development policy and towards a more rights and needs focused 
development agenda. 
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My hypothesis is that the World Bank and the OMS continue to be driven by neo-liberalism 
despite its claims to be undergoing a transformation of its ideological underpinnings as 
evidenced by, among other things, the proliferation of its Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. 
Further, it is proposed that NEPAO is heavily influenced by the OMS agenda in an effort to 
secure donor support. This study seeks to explore these proposals. 
(c) The Organisation of This Study 
Following from the introduction, this study is divided into four main sections. The first sets 
down the basis for the rest of the study by assessing the theoretical tools with which to view 
development. The second section looks at the historical overview of Africa's economic shape 
since the end of the colonial era. The third section evaluates and compares the African 
development initiatives, taken up by the World Bank, the United Nations, and Africans 
themselves, to reverse the negative economic picture in Africa. The first three sections offer a 
detailed picture of the historical context of NEPAD. Section Four makes a study of NEPAD in 
light of what has gone before. Each section may include an introduction, summaries and a 
conclusion. A more detailed outline of the organisation of this study can be found in the 'Table 
of Contents'. 
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SECTION 1 
THEORETICAL TOOLS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT 
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"Development can be conceived only within an ideological framework,,14 
Ideological frameworks are important to development efforts and studies as they provide a lens 
through which patterns can be drawn out and reported upon. The quote above highlights that all 
conceptions of development are made through some form of lens. It is important to bear in mind 
that no theory can seek or succeed in offering a complete picture. This refers to the fact that no 
theory can have exclusive claims on the truth. Additionally, it is valuable to acknowledge that 
theories can and do empower some actors and policy agendas and, on the other hand, dismiss 
others. 
The dominant international relations theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism fail to address 
many of the issues relevant to this field of study. However, in offering insights into the 
behaviour of states, they are valuable tools for understanding and explaining 'power politics' 
within the international political and economic system - the forum within which development 
debates exist. Both neo-realism and neo-liberalism are conceptual frameworks that shape 
individuals' images of the world and influence research priorities and policy debates and choices. 
They represent status-quo perspectives. They are what Robert Cox 15 describes as problem 
solving theories, in that they address both issues and problems that could disrupt the status quo, 
such as issues of security, conflict and co-operation. Neither advances prescriptions for major 
reform or radical transformation of the international system. They are system maintainer 
theories, in that their proponents, both sharing many assumptions about actors, values, issues and 
power arrangements in the international system, are by and large satisfied with this international 
system. 
The debate between the two most influentiaL long-standing and well-developed international 
relations theories - neo-realism and neo-liberalism - omits many issues and narrows the space for 
debate. Assumptions about international relations that are useful to development debates are 
overlooked. Both concur on the questions they address but diverge over their responses. 
Significantly, both consider questions about how to keep the system operating. Neo-realists 
respond through the study of security issues and are concerned with issues of power and survival, 
while neo-liberals respond through the study of political economy and focus on co-operation and 
i-l Roberts. G .. Questioning Development, London. Returned Volunteer Action. 1984, p.7 
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institutions. Given that both are concerned with continuity not change, their field of debate fails 
to address questions about the dominant belief system, or the distribution of power and how 
these may be connected to development discourse and policy. Further, both theories neglect the 
fact that with the rise of globalisation, political activities may be shifting away from the state. 
Other theories exist to help conceptualise a framework through which African development can 
be analysed. Despite the collapse of Communist party rule in the former Soviet Union, Marx's 
work retains relevance, especially his analysis of capitalism. Marxist theories aim to expose the 
deeper and underlying truth - the hidden workings of capitalism - thereby providing the structural 
contcxt in which events develop. The context of African development policy from a Marxist 
viewpoint is therefore constituted by the structures of global capitalism and the processes that 
operate within them. Marxist theories look at the world through a different conceptual lens to the 
two theories so far discussed. In particular, class analysis is central. Unlike liberals who believe 
that an essential harmony of interests exists between various social groups, in keeping with Marx 
and Engles' assessment that 'the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class 
struggle' 16, Marxist thought is premised on the belief that society is systematically prone to class 
conflict. In a capitalist society, the class divide is split between the bourgeoisie/capitalists on the 
one side and the proletariat/workers on the other. Lenin's theory of imperialism extended Marx's 
work of the simple divergence of interests between the proletariat and bourgeoisie with the 
inclusion of a two-tier structure within the world economy with a dominant core exploiting a less 
developed periphery. This resulted from the development of a perceived new stage of capitalism, 
monopoly capitalism, which denied the existence of an automatic harmony of interests between 
all workers. In this reading, the bourgeoisie in the core countries use profits gained through the 
exploitation of the periphery to benefit their domestic proletariat. It follows that the Marxist 
view is especially relevant when considering an alternate rendition of Africa's development 
crisis. In short, it creates the space for a debate regarding the cause of this phenomenon. 
Drawing on Lenin's work and particularly the notion of core and periphery, the Latin American 
Dependency School proposed that countries in the periphery were suffering as a result of what 
Raul Prebisch called the 'declining terms of trade d7 . He argued that the price of manufactured 
goods increased more rapidly than that of raw materials. The implication of this is that given 
I' Cox. R., 'Social Forces. States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory". in Cox. R., and 
Sinclair. 1. Approac;hes !QWorld Order, CUP, 1996 
It) Marx. K .. and Engels. F .. Communist Manifesto. OUP. 1998 
I' Prebisch. R .. TO\;ards a N~rade Policy for Development. New York. United Nations. 1964 
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their reliance on primary goods, the countries of the periphery are becoming increasingly poorer 
relative to core countries over time. From this framework emerged the contemporary world 
system theory. This School and especially the work of its main champion, Immanuel 
Wallerstein!8, has been an influential tool for vociferating an alternative reading of the current 
world system - a world-economy or capitalist system, in which the periphery is exploited by the 
core through the transfer of resources from the former to the latter. 
The focus of Marxist analysis has shifted towards a more super-structural one - through the work 
of the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci. He explored the processes by which consent for a 
particular social and political system was produced and reproduced through the operation of 
hegemony, which allows, through the institutions of civil society, the ideas and ideologies of the 
ruling stratum to become widely dispersed and accepted within society. Robert Cox has 
transferred several of Gramsci' s key concepts, such as hegemony, into a global context in an 
effort to internationalise his work!'). In contrast to the status guo problem-solving theories 
mentioned above, which accept the parameters of the present order, thereby giving it legitimacy, 
Cox offers critical theory, which, in line with Marx's emancipation goals, attempts to challenge 
the prevailing order by seeking out, analysing and, where possible, assisting social processes that 
can potentially lead to social change. One way in which theory can contribute towards such 
normative goals is by developing an understanding of the world order that illustrates whose 
interests are served, thereby raising the issue of legitimacy and how social structures can be 
transcended or overcome. In this way, Cox's theory challenges the problem solving theories as it 
highlights their hidden normative constitution. In the words of Cox, "Theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose,,20. Such Marxist analysis reveals problem-solving theories as 
serving the interests of those in favour of maintaining the status gu02l. Cox's analysis of 
hegemonic structures in the present world order is particularly relevant to this study. It offers a 
perspective for understanding the acceptance of certain policies in development efforts, such as 
the neo-liberal policies that are pushed by the United States (US). Marxists call for a deeper 
analysis of why such policies are adopted. They argue that such a move is strongly in the 
interests of the developed world and is largely a result of coercion. Gramsci and Cox's work 
IX Wallerstein. I., 'The Inter-State Structure of the Modem World-System', in Smith, S., Booth. K., and Zalewski. 
M., (cds.), II11emational Theory: Positivism and Beyond. CUP, 1996 
:'l Cox. R .. 'A Perspective on Globalization', in Mittelman, J.H., (ed), Globalization: Critical Reflections, Boulder, 
Col.: Lynne Reinner, 1996 
Cox, R., . A Perspective on Globalization'. in Mittelman, J.H., (ed), Globalization: Critical Reflections, Boulder. 
Col.: Lynne ReinneL 1996. p.R7 
.:1 Cox, R., 'A Perspective on Globalization', in Mittelman, J.H., (cd). Globalization: Critical Reflections, Boulder, 
Col.: Lynne Reinner. 1996. p.RR 
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combines this explanation with the notion of consent. Drawing on their work, it may be argued 
that neo-liberal policies may seem common sense or acceptable because of the hegemonic power 
of the US. The acceptance of neo-liberal policies, especially given their many detrimental effects 
on developing countries, which will be discussed in more detail later, is taken as an example of 
the hegemonic power of the US. 
Rationalist theories are explanatory/foundationalist in that they see the world as external to 
theories of it. For them, theories are more a means of reporting on the world, drawing out 
patterns to simplify the explanation. This contrasts with the perspective that theories have the 
power to be self-confirming and are important in the construction of the world. There is a 
divergence of beliefs regarding whether truth claims can have an objective or meta-theoretical 
foundation. Foundationalists, who tend to ally with rationalist theories, would answer 
affirmatively, taking a more positivist stance. Anti-foundationalists would argue otherwise, 
denying the existence of neutral facts from which theories are drawn. The adoption by policy 
makers of non-positivist or reflectivist theories with constitutive and non-foundationalist 
assumptions, as demonstrated by, for example, the inclusion of post modernist concepts into the 
World Bank development discourse, serves to sway attention away from issues that in many 
ways need to be addressed. Indeed, post-modernism may be said to pose a threat to development 
if it denies space for debates regarding the relationship between certain theories and the reality of 
development dynamics in Africa. 
Further arguments exist which posit that rationalism and reflectivism can be theoretically 
combined, as held by Social Constructivists such as Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999)22. However, 
this claim can be countered by seeing social theory as necessarily theorised on two platfonns: one 
that offers an inside (refiectivist) account, focusing on the meaning actors attach to their actions, 
and another that offers an outside (rationalist) account, which sees the beliefs of actors as the 
product of material interests. The barrier held to separate the two is that both have mutually 
exclusive assumptions, 
"Wendt. A.. 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: Thc Social Construction of Power Politics', International 
Organisation. 46. 2. 1992. pp.391-425 or Wendt, A., Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, CUP, 1999 
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Section Conclusion 
A variety of conceptual tools exist through which development may be analysed. Nco-realism 
and nco-liberalism tend not to fit comfortably into analyses of development as they fail in many 
ways to open their agenda to core development issues, such as the relevance of distribution of 
power and non state actor functions. Marxist theory offers greater space for debates regarding 
the cause of Africa's underdevelopment. Lenin develops Marx's analysis of the structures of 
global capitalism and the processes within them by his inclusion of a two-tier structure in the 
world economy - a dominant core and an exploited, less developed periphery. The Latin 
American Dependency School's World System Theory develops this in more depth. Gramsci 
offers a more super structural lens through which Africa's underdevelopment may be seen as a 
result of hegemony and its creation of consent. In this way Gramsci and Cox's critical theory 
aims to challenge the prevailing order by exposing whose interests are served and by what 
means. Theories may be taken to be either explanatory or construcivist. Proponents of the 
former tend to be foundationalist in that they see truth as having objective and grounded 
foundations. On the other hand, those who see theories as playing a part in the making of 
'realities' tend to be anti-foundationalist in that they deny the existence of neutral facts from 
which theories may be drawn and claims to truth may be laid. These theories, which offer 
different conceptual lenses through which the information that follows may be looked at, will to 
some extent be worked into the following analysis. 
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SECTION 2 
MAPPING AFRICA'S ECONOMIC TRENDS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
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Section Introduction 
This chapter will look at Africa's economic trends since Independence. Different indicators will 
be used including structural ones, social ones and economic growth rates. Africa's perfonnance 
will also be compared to other developing countries and the developed world. Further, the 
causes of Africa's development dynamic will be explored. 
a) The post-Independence history of Africa's economic trends 
The orthodox method of measuring development according to economic growth, namely GOP 
per capita and industrialisation, shows that since 1945 there have, in some ways, been 
noteworthy gains for developing countries. For example, from the 1950's to the end of the 
1980's economic growth in developing countries averaged 4.9 % per year, compared with 3.5 % 
per year in developed countries.23 However, some regions within the developing countries 
bracket perfonned far better than others. While Asia and the Americas achieved substantial 
growth rates, Africa's development has been plagued by problems. 
It is widely believed that, relative to other developing regIOns, Africa's post-Independence 
development has been a failure. In the words of the Overseas Development Institute (001) 
"Evidence shows that on most of the comparative indicators the region's record has indeed been 
pOOr.,,24 Table A (below) summarises some of the evidence and compares the African record 
with other low-income countries. 
2; Adams. N.B.. Worlds Apart: The North-South Qivide and the International System. London, Zed. 1993. p.8 
21 Overseas Development Institute. 'Explaining Africa's Development Experiences'. Development Institute. Briefing 
Paper. June 1992. p.1 
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Table A: Comparative Indicators of Economic Performance25 
All Low 
SSA Low Income Income 
SSA Countries 
1) Structural Indicators 
Gross domestic savings as % GDP 
1965 14 ... 18 
1989 13 ... 26 
i 
!Gross domestic investment as % GDP 
1965 14 ... 19 
1989 15 ... 28 
:-- . 
Primary products as % total exports 
1965 92 ... 76 
1989 89 ... 48 
Energy consumption per capital (kg of oil equivalent) 
1965 72 ... 125 
~ .... 
1989 73 ... 330 
2) Social Indicators (% change 1965-1989) 
Crude death rate -30 -32 -39 
Infant mortality rate -30 -32 -37 
Calori, per capita -1 0 
Primary school enrolment 55 58 60 
Secondary school enrolment 314 292 207 
3) Economic growth, 1980 -89 (% p.a.) 
Income (GNP) per capita -1.2 -1.1 0.7 
Private consumption per capita -2.2 -0.5 -0.5 
Export volumes -0.7 -1.8 0.8 
_. 
Prices (inflation rate) 19.6 30.2 14.8 
c5 World Bank. cited in: Overseas Development Institute. 'Explaining Africa's Development Experiences', 
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In the first three decades after Independence, sub-Saharan Africa's political economIes 
experienced cyclical but essentially contracting rates of growth of per capita income, particularly 
in the 1980's, which saw a 1.2% drop per annum (see Table A, above). There have also been 
comparatively large and persistent balance of payments and inflation problems, very low levels 
of saving and investment and a declining productivity of investment. In terms of economic 
performance, Africa is shown to be in poor shape relative to other low-income countries. A 
comparison made on the basis of social indicators may be said to portray a slightly less negative 
picture for Africa. School enrolments have increased and mortality rates in sub-Saharan Africa 
have a lower negative percentage change than the average for all low income countries. 
However, as Table A demonstrates other low income countries have generally made more 
progress. 
Development Institute. Briefing Paper. June 1992. p.l 
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Table B 
Africa's Share in the World Economy 
14 
Population GOP Exports FOI 
. 1950 
. 1970 
01990 
02000 
Source: African Economic Outlook, Organisation for Economic Co-operat ion and Development/ African Development Bank, 2002, p.14 
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Table B shows that in terms of GOP, exports and foreign direct investment (FOI), Africa's 
participation in the world economy has declined considerably over the past 50 years. This table 
shows that the decline of Africa's importance in the global economy is much more dramatic 
when assessed in terms of its relations with the rest of the world, than in terms of straight 
economic activity. Thus, while Africa's share of global GOP fell by a third between 1950 and 
2000, its world exports fell by two thirds during the same period.26 Such statistics call for an 
analysis of the historical causes of Africa's decline in the world economy. The following 
discussion is divided into two broad categories: external and internal factors. 
(b) Explaining Africa's decline in the world economy: External factors 
An important factor that helps to account for this downward trend are changes in the terms of 
trade. To understand the effect of this, it is necessary to look into the history of Africa's 
dependence on foreign forces. During World War Two, the allies increasingly accepted that the 
protectionist trade policies of the 1930's were a major factor in the outbreak of War. Thus, an 
institutional framework was devised to provide the foundations for a liberal international 
economic order based on the pursuit of free trade. The accepted solution to failing development 
was largely seen to be increased integration into the global marketplace. Based on the 
assumption that Western lifestyles and modes of economic organisation were superior, the 
developed world saw the Third World as economically backward and thus needing intervention 
in their economies. Thus, following the demise of colonialism, Africa was left with an economy 
that was integrated with the world economy, only in so far as it was a receiver of imports for a 
minority urban elite and an exporter of a few primary commodities. In this way, African 
dependence continued after Independence. Political Independence failed to address the 
continent's subordinate position within the world economic and political system, where Africa 
largely served as a source of raw commodities, an underdeveloped market for excess production 
and an outlet for financial capital. Still today, economic specialisation in the form of reliance on 
the export of a few primary commodities, renders Africa vulnerable to foreign forces beyond its 
~(, African Economic Outlook, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development! African Development 
Bank. 2002. p.13 
25 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
C
pe
 To
wn
control, namely price drops in these key export items. The drop in the main exports of Bukino 
Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali and Uganda, which practiced economic specialisation, and which led 
to a fall in their share of world exports between 1995 and 1999, is a case in point. Such 
vulnerability at least partly explains the decline in Africa's economic performance and political 
VOIce. 
From a Marxist perspective, Africa's dependency is seen as a result of the crisis of capital 
accumulation. Such a reading argues that "as capitalist economies mature, as capital 
accumulates, and as profit rates fall [because of over accumulation leading to a fall in demand 
growth rates which leads to a fall in profit rates], the capitalist economies are compelled to seize 
colonies and create dependencies to serve as markets, investment outlets, and sources of food and 
raw materials.,,27 It is argued that as industrial capital is employed, to make production more 
efficient and less expensive, there is a declining demand for labour that leads to higher 
unemployment and lower wages. Given that the labour supply represents a large proportion of 
the market, increased unemployment and reduced wages results in falling demand for produced 
goods and consequently falling profits. This in tum produces a concentration of ownership, 
which increases labour's relative share of the market, further reducing demand and profits. For 
such advanced capitalist economies, marked by a crisis of over accumulation that comes from 
their tendency to overproduce, integration of the peripheral economies into the international 
political economy is sought-after. It allows for the inevitable devaluation of these advanced 
capitalist economies, implicit in such a crisis, to shift to these peripheral economies. 
Africa's growing foreign dependency and development crisis can also be seen as an effect of the 
global economic crisis that took hold in the mid 1970's. With the emergence of significant 
weaknesses in the US economy, causing a crisis of confidence in the US dollar, the US changed 
the rules of the international monetary system in 1971, thereby breaking the principles of the 
Bretton Woods institutions to impose import duties. Facing stagflation (low growth and high 
inflation) and the break down of the Bretton Woods system, the major industrialised countries 
began to discuss monetary issues among themselves. Most notable was the 'Group of Seven', 
which came together in 1975. Within such groups, policies of new protectionism were very 
much at the fore, largely to keep out new competitive imports from developing countries, 
c' Gilpin. R .. summarising Marx, quoted in Balaam, D., & Veseth. M., Introduction tolnternational Political 
Economy. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1996. pp.67-68 
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principally Asia and the Americas. The Multifiber Arrangement of 1973 was critical in this 
regard, placing restrictions on all textile and apparel imports from developing countries. 
Combined with these unfavourable terms of trade, the oil price shock of 1973-4 added to the 
spiral of distress in developing countries. Following this shock, the beneficiaries of inflated oil 
prices eagerly sought outlets for their profits. Much of these petrodollars came to be borrowed 
by developing countries that were offered large-scale loans at knock down prices. The 
detrimental effects of this for Africa came to a head with the 1979 oil crisis that led to massive 
interest rate hikes and plummeting commodity prices. Importantly, this crisis also served as a 
turning point in Africa's development as it drove home the possibility that these loans could not 
be repaid. From this point, many small agrarian-cum-industrialising African state-led economies 
plunged into indebtedness and crisis management where economic distress, mismanagement and 
corruption took hold. As a consequence, the development discourse of African states came to be 
discredited. In its place, IMF and World Bank policy gained ascendance. Their policies rather 
than those of African governments were claimed by the IFIs to be the 'right policies' of market 
led growth, which was seen as synonymous with 'development'. This effectively marked a shift 
in the focus of African development efforts away from the social democratic and Fabian socialist 
principles combined with Keynesian and Marxist development theory, which had dominated the 
modernising efforts of African states since Independence. 
Table 8 also illustrates that in addition to a declining participation in the global economy, 
Africa's share of FDI has declined significantly since Independence. Indeed, it halved in value 
between the 1970's and 1980's and again in the 1990's. 80th these indicators of Africa's 
economic performance are inter-linked. The continent's shrinking involvement in the global 
economy, particularly in terms of its share of foreign trade, is at least partly an effect of its own 
efforts to attract FDI for raw material production at the expense of industrial investment, which 
would arguably have better served Africa's move to globalisation. The under investment in 
Africa relative to elsewhere has further contributed to its shrinking foreign trade. The UNCTAD 
World Investment Report (see Table C, below) outlines some of the principal reasons for this. It 
is important to note that corruption is the factor that most multinationals claim dissuades them 
from investing in Africa. Thus, it is necessary here to tum to the part played by internal factors 
in the decline of Africa's participation in the world economy. 
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Table C: What multinational companies say dissuades them from investing in Africa 
Source: UNCT AD 2000 World Investment Report 
I. Level of extortion Bnbery I. Acress to global mari<ets 
OJ Po~tical and economic outlook 
o Access to finance 
E!I Administration costs of doi~ business 
• State of physical infrastructure I. Tax regime 
o Access to Iow-cost ullSkilled labour I. Regulatory and legal frameworn goverring FI 
o Access to natural resources I. Access 10 skilled labour I. Investment incentives I. S;ze of local marnet I. Prof;tiMty of Investment I. Trade Pol;cy I. Access 10 reg;onal marnelS I. Growth of local marnet 
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(c) Explainine Africa's decline in the world economy: Internal factors 
Many voices passionately argue that Africa would have developed dramatically if global forces 
had been more favourable. However, such a claim fails to rest on solid foundations. While 
global forces can be shown in many ways to have worked against Africa's development, internal 
dysfunction such as poor governance, for which Africa must hold at least some accountability, 
has played a major role in explaining the continent's crisis in development. Notable flaws thus 
exist in commonly invoked arguments, which assert that unstable commodity prices, industrial 
country protectionism, Africa's deteriorating terms of trade, limited access to world capital 
markets and foreign debt overhangs explain the continent's economic decay. Indeed, there is 
clear evidence that long-term commodity prices are declining in real terms / relative to the prices 
of manufactures. While this trend points to the desirability of diversification, Africa has 
demonstrated little effort and/or success in this regard. By contrast, other low-income countries 
have attained better terms of tradc records than African countries, largely because they have been 
more successful in reducing their dependence on commodity exports. In a similar vein, it is 
unclear that Africa as a whole faces worse terms of trade than other developing regions whose 
economies perform better than Africa's. Although Africa has indeed faced the effects of 
industrial country protectionism, relative to other developing regions, it can be said that, in some 
ways, it receives a favourable deal. It has benefited from a variety of preferential agreements, 
some fonns of protectionism and a greater share of total development assistance.28 The OEeD's 
agricultural protectionism, for example, mainly hit commodities such as sugar, rice and certain 
other grains that affect Asia more than Africa. Despite this, Africa's economic performance falls 
behind the other developing regions, pointing to internal failures such as its difficulty in turning 
production capacity into export capacity. While external factors have undoubtedly contributed to 
Africa's foreign debt crisis, internal weaknesses such as weak export performances, poor 
governance and corruption have certainly aggravated the problem. 
Overseas Development Institute, Briefing Paper, June 1992, 'Explaining Africa's Development Experiences. p.4 
29 
Un
i e
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Section conclusion 
Since Independence, Africa's economic performance within the global economy has remained 
poor. Whether its economic performance is judged on structural, social or economic growth 
indices, the results all paint a similar picture, albeit with some divergence over the degree of 
severity of the crisis. External factors such as terms of trade, industrial country protectionism, 
unstable commodity prices, access to global markets, and foreign debt, as well as internal factors 
such as weak export performance and the more fundamental problems of corruption and poor 
governance are to blame for this situation. The method used for measuring economic 
performance, which is linked to development paradigms, does however playa significant role in 
the shaping of development plans. Some of the most important development plans will now be 
addressed. 
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SECTION 3 
BEYOND BRETTON: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AFRICA'S 
POST -INUEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES 
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Section Introduction 
The poor state of Africa's economic performance, especially in relation to the rest of the world 
has attracted attention in the form of development initiatives to try and reverse the decay. A 
variety of such plans have been formulated by the IFIs and by Africa. In this section, points of 
difference between and within the World Bank plans, the UN plans and African led initiatives 
will be drawn out. The guiding paradigms, motivations and results of the different policy 
frameworks will all be analysed. The first part will look at the World Bank plans, the second 
will look at the UN plans, and the third section will look at Africa's own history of development 
initiatives. The final part will assess what factors most account for the success or failure of 
development efforts. This will set the basis for the final section, which will assess Africa's 
current development challenge and the proposed solution: NEPAD. 
(a) World Bank Development Policies 
In response to the aforementioned debt cnSlS of the 1970's, the 1980's saw a shift in 
development discourse led by the IFIs. Contrary to the embedded liberal development thinking 
that, under the lead of the economist John Maynard Keynes, accorded the state a central role in 
development efforts, neo-liberal economic and political philosophy came into ascendance. This 
entailed a diminished role for the state in development and an amplified role for the market. 
Liberalisation of trade and investment combined with the restructuring of national economies 
were held up as tools to benefit the global welfare. This strategy was pursued by the IMF, the 
World Bank and at the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which heralded the creation of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). It carried the private role of the market into areas hitherto 
subject to national regulation and that traditionally had been the domain of state responsibility. 
The IF I-formulated policy agenda was warmly received by most Western bilateral donors. The 
decline of Marxist and Social Democratic movements during the 1980's served to suppress 
criticism from the left and the end of the Cold War entrenched the ideological shift in 
development thinking in favour of [neo-] liberalism. Francis Fukyama's influential 'end of 
history' thesis expresses this when describing the fall of Communism in the former Soviet Union 
as: 
32 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
"the triumph of the West. .. an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism ... [and] the 
total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western [neo-]liberalism,,29 
In accordance with the neo-liberal thinking and policy trends, Africa's debt crisis of the 1980's 
prompted initiation by the IFIs of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). The priorities of SAPs 
were to prevent developing countries defaulting on loans since such action could bring on global 
financial crisis. In pursuit of this goal, SAPs aimed to impose immediate measures to reduce 
inflation, government expenditure, and the role of the state in the economy. They also aimed to 
attract investment. Market forces of capitalism, trade liberalisation and privatisation prevailed as 
the core tenants of SAPs and the nco-liberal thinking from which they derived. 
SAPs were held up by their proponents as the means of improving the lives of the rural 
populations. Such claims emerged from the fact that the IF Is articulated adverse domestic rural-
urban terms of trade, and particularly urban bias, as the primary cause of Africa's development 
crisis. In the World Bank's Berg Report (1981), urban dwellers are thus perceived to be enjoying 
higher than average standards of living at the expense of the larger rural population. However, 
the World Bank diagnosis avoided the issue of declining international terms of trade. Equally, it 
failed to acknowledge the fact that these arguments came at a time when urban popUlations in 
Africa were experiencing drastic drops in real income. The link between income deterioration 
and corruption was therefore neglected. This proved one of several fundamental flaws in SAP 
thinking. 
From the mid 1980's, social science disciplines in the academic world had become infiltrated by 
post modernist influences. As a result of their disbelief in metanarratives and in foundational 
epistemology, post-modernists dismiss development theories as teleological discourse. Thus, 
their deconstruction of (development) theory served to make attempts to assess the overall 
impact of policy self-defeating. In taking apart the very concepts and methods of thought 
construction and questioning the conditions under which theories emerge, post modernists 
suffered a powerful attack for being too theoretical and for failing to give adequate attention to 
the 'real' world. They were also rebuked for deflecting criticism of IFI polieies in sub-Saharan 
Africa during the 1980's and 1990's. Lacking academic and analytical defence against IFI policy 
dictates, African governments were thus overpowered by forces in favour of the adoption of neo-
liberal policies and SAPs. 
:') Fukuyama. F.. 'The End of History'. The National Interest 16, 1989. p.3 
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In general, the 1980's and 1990's took Africa down a path of further impoverishment. After two 
decades of IFI imposed policies, the distance to economic development targets for the African 
majority had not only proved out of reach but had, in fact, lengthened. Thus, the number of 
people in sub-Saharan Africa living below the poverty line - namely below $1 per day, or the 
equivalent of that amount in purchasing power parity terms rose from 217 million in 1987 to 
291 million in 1998,30 In weakening the sovereignty of governments over their economic policy, 
SAPs initially depressed the recipient economies, as devalued currencies were tackled with 
higher interest rates and government's share of aggregate demand dropped. Social and human 
development suffered as user fees and reduced government subsidies of education and health 
brought down demand for these services. Additionally, the liberalisation of trade tended to 
favour imports, especially given the underdevelopment of the industrial sector and local 
economies. Thus, while the value of African imports increased steadily, growing 5.7% from 
1975-84, 7.7% from 1985-89, and 1.1% from 1990-98, on the other hand, exports grew more 
slowly, rising 6.8% from 1975-84,0.7% from 1985-89, and -0.1% in the 1990s.31 Capital flew 
from the developing countries to the more secure capital markets of Europe and the USA, thus 
adding to the over accumulation of capital in the advanced economies. Developing states, as 
SAP recipients, were serving as tools for maintaining international economic stability and further 
entrenching their own underdevelopment. In this way, SAPs were perpetuating the dependency 
dynamic. 
The IFls directed blame for the deterioration of Africa's development away from their preferred 
development policy and instead resorted to the argument that African governments were not 
implementing SAPs sufficiently or on a timely basis. Later, the justification shifted to the lack of 
a suitable 'enabling environment' for Structural Adjustment implementation. This acted as a 
kind of broad umbrella explanation for a variety of constraints including lack of physical 
infrastructure, property law and democracy. However, the inadequacies and paradoxes of neo-
liberal policies, their failure in terms of resource mobilisation, income distribution and 
governance, were becoming increasingly too great to ignore. Criticism mounted from both the 
left and right, and even within the world's most powerful decision making circles32 , especially 
within the last half decade. As a consequence, the hegemonic position and nco-liberal orthodoxy 
10 The World Bank. 2001. pp.t7. 23 cited in Economic Development in Africa: From Adjustment to Poverty 
Reduction: What is new? UNCTAD. 2002, p.2 
'.1 World Bank. African Development Indicators, Washington: World Bank. 2000, pp.87-88 
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of World Bank economists have been increasingly questioned:B Growing public awareness in 
this area has also led to protest against IFIs' economic tiberalisation policies, as demonstrated by 
the Seattle riots of November 1999 in opposition to the WTO's role in the globalisation process. 
The negative effect of these broadly neo-liberal conditions for African development may not 
have been explicitly intended. Rather, the problem is closely tied to the fact that their architects 
conceive of development narrowly as economic, rather than social development. They fail to 
tackle the root causes of inequality and systemic economic dependence, and so they further 
perpetuate the pernicious effects of advanced capitalist over-accumulation. 
As an institution whose existence following the reconstruction of post World War Two Europe is 
premised on the concept of development, the World Bank has faced pressure to rethink its policy 
discourse, given rising acceptance of the failure of African development efforts. From this 
context, it has begun to develop a revisionist African development discourse, shifting from neo-
liberalism, which ardently believes in the benefits of market optimism, to post-modem 
liberalism. The latter combines neo-liberalism with a stress on commitment to poverty alleviation 
as a major policy priority, an emphasis on plurality in line with the post-modernist perspective, 
and a degree of recognition of that liberalisation policies have disadvantaged sub-Saharan 
Africa's ability to compete on the world market. The market, which historically has been pushed 
as the solution to Africa's development challenge, is thus admitted in passing to be one of the 
'external shocks' causing economic problems with profound implications for African agriculture 
and industry. In short, an incremental shift is thus taking place, which increasingly locates 
development discourse in numerous local features and perceptions of poverty. This new focus is 
evident in the World Bank publication 'Can Africa Claim the 21 st Century.J4 and in the 
proliferation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which constitute one of the more recent 
frameworks devised by the World Bank and IMF for promoting the pro-poor use of debt relief 
and discounted loans in the poorest countries. 
The new World Bank development discourse avoids positing clear-cut solutions and causal 
analysis. In content, it is drawn from post-modernist thinkers such as Foucault and his work on 
the power/knowledge relationship. Post-modernists' epistemological focus rejects 
See 'Slimming the Bretton Woods Duo', The Economist, March 18.2000; and 'The Bumpy Ride of Jo Stiglitz', 
The Economist. December 18. 1999 
11 Fox L and Brown. L.. (cds.), The Struggle for Acc;ountability: The World Bank, NGO's, and Grassroots 
Movements. Cambridge. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998 
35 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
metanarratives, seeing them as deriving from the hidden agenda of an 'unspoken order', the 
preservation of which is served by their uptake in development policy. Foucault35 and other 
post-modernists also avoid focusing on material factors as an influence on discourse. In this 
way, they stifle debates regarding how policy choices affect development in Africa, preferring to 
study the relationship between shifts in power and discourse. 
It will be argued henceforth that despite this shift in development policy, the underlying 
dominance of nco-liberalism remains intact36 and is further shielded from attack because, by and 
large, the over-arching material causes of impoverishment, linked to international politics and 
policies, remain in the background. The World Bank is trying to bridge the seeming 
incompatibility of the dual priorities of poverty alleviation and market liberalisation by joining 
hands with post-modernism, with its focus on plurality as the band aid holding this loose 
concoction together. However, this alliance between neo-liberalism and post-modernism deflects 
attention away from a much-needed critique of neo-liberalism and the study of its causal 
relationship with Africa's development dilemma. Examining the World Bank's policy shift in 
this way has significant relevance to NEPAD given that NEPAD seeks support from the World 
Bank. 
Over the last few decades implementation of the 'right policies' has been the African 
governments' ticket to foreign donor funding. The determinant of the right policies has over this 
time been the IFls. Thus, countries have been rewarded or penalised for their degree of 
adherence to the IFIs' policy dictates. Exposing this dynamic is an important step In 
understanding the dilemma faced by NEPAD and, indeed, other past development initiatives. In 
basing its capacity for success on the attainment of IFI support it is argued that NEP AD must tow 
the DMS line, which in turn may be argued to weaken its ability to serve the indigenous African 
development agenda. 
The financial and political institutions created after the Second World War, the Bretton Woods 
institutions, provide the foundation for current political and economic power arrangements. By 
and large they constitute the DMS. They embrace neo-liberal or realist/neo-realist assumptions 
about the world, they promote free trade or open markets (/capitalism) and western democratic 
q World Bank. 'Can Africa Claim the 21 Century?' Washington. DC. 2000 
" Foucault. M .. f'Qwer/Knowledge: Selectegln!efyiews and Other Writings. 1972-77. Pantheon Books, 1980 
31> Blaikie. P., ·Development. post-, anti-, and popUlist: a critical review'. Environment and Planning, Volume 32, 
2000, pp. 1 033-1 050 
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values and institutions. While most of the leading Western and donor states adhere to the US led 
call for 'enlargement' of the community of democratic and capitalist nation-states, in practice 
neo-liberal foreign policies are not necessarily linked to the ideals of democratic peace, free trade 
and open borders. Rather, national interests take precedence over morality and universal ideals. 
In addition, much to the dismay of traditional realists, economic interests are given priority over 
geo-political ones. Rational choice approaches and game theory have been integrated into neo-
realist and nco-liberal theory to explain policy choices. This development is crucial in explaining 
some of the detrimental effects that nco-liberalism and donor influenced policy can have on 
Africa's development. For while the OMS tends to pursue development policies that adhere to 
the national interests of the donor governments, the indigenous African development agenda is 
motivated by the priority of African governments' interests. 
World Bank/donor country/OMS interests have been made dominant in the development process 
through the two-gap model of economic growth, which gives a pivotal role to foreign capital and 
foreign aid. This model essentially allows for conditions to be attached to resource provisions. 
Thus, the power to over-rule plays itself out in donors' selectivity in allocating aid among 
recipients. The criteria for selectivity has changed with the shift in the development thinking of 
the major donor countries since the end of the Cold War from one motivated by geo-politics to 
one motivated by globalisation. Linked to the World Bank's shift away from an entitlement 
approach and towards an effectiveness approach in the provision of development assistance, the 
selection criteria is based on priorities of globalisation such as market integration and macro-
economic policy rather the Cold War geo-political imperatives. 
This proves problematic for Africa's development as it lays an unstable and foreign-dominated 
foundation for attaining aid. In this schema, the selection process will be subject to the bias of 
the selection panel and/or to the interests of the donors. Given the non-binding aspect of aid 
provision, when the selection panel goes against the interests of the donors, aid is likely to dry 
up. Such a selection process suggests a colonial hue. An additional problem with the shift from 
an entitlement to an effectiveness approach is that the unsatisfactory performance of one African 
country may be seen by the donors to negatively affect the performance or potential performance 
of other African countries. Thus, the provision of aid becomes subject to the unstable force of 
contagious vilification as a wave of Afro-pessimism takes hold. These are some of the issues 
which have plagued past African development initiatives and which NEPAO must address. 
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Summary 
World Bank development policy discourse has been dominated for the past two decades at least 
by neo-liberal policies. Adhering to a highly formalist and positivist perspective, the concept of 
the 'engine of growth' has been central to its understanding of 'development'. This has been 
perceived as either a source of extraction, a catalyst or a means for building a modem national 
economy. Failing to achieve African economic take-off, the World Bank has undergone a policy 
revision in what is seen here as a bid to deflect criticism. In particular, it has co-opted a post-
modernist perspective to bridge the gap between economic growth and poverty alleviation. 
However, this is seen to largely be a smokescreen behind which the Washington Consensus and 
particularly neo-liberalism remains intact. This bears relevance to NEPAD given that the latter 
claims to be grounded in pursuit of the African development agenda, which emphasises self-
reliance and self-sustainability but, at the same time, in order to secure funds it is pressurised to 
adhere to the OMS. The compatibility of the OMS and the African development agenda 
therefore demands analysis later in this paper. This will offer some comment on the relevance of 
NEPAD. 
(b) UN Development Efforts 
In the 1980's, while World Bank development initiatives were being pursued, the UN also began 
taking major steps to address Africa's social and economic problems. In December 1984 it 
passed resolution 39/29 and the "Declaration on the Critical Economic situation in Africa", 
which highlighted Africa's development crisis. A special session was convened in May 1986 to 
deliberate on the plight of Africa and based on the African Priority Programme for Economic 
Recovery (APPER), the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery 
and Development, 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD) was adopted. In contrast to World Bank plans of 
this time, the UN was putting greater emphasis on building a 'compact' between African leaders 
and the international community, and on the principles of mutual commitment, responsibility and 
co-operation. It was effectively acting as a vehicle through which this compact could be 
established. From the international community it sought to obtain a commitment to mobilise 
resources through UN-channelled aid, and from the African leaders it sought to obtain a 
commitment to implementing "sharply focused, practical and operational set[ s] of activities, 
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priorities and policies" at national, sub-regional and regional levels as elaborated in the APPER. 
It was specified that an estimated US$128.1 billion would be needed to implement the strategy, 
of which African governments pledged to raise about $82.5 billion domestically. Its ideological 
underpinning was that development of agricultural and food security sectors, through the 
allocation of 45% of total resources, would have a trickle down effect on African economies. 
However, lack of co-ordination with World Bank national policies and the problematic 
environment created by Structural Adjustment measures led the UN to comment on progress as 
uneven and insecure. 37 
Responding to the failure of UN-PAAERD and Africa's development crisis, the UN launched 
another programme in 1991: the "United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in 
the 1990's" (UN-NADAF). Based on two key principles, shared responsibility and full 
partnership, this sought to accelerate transformation, integration, diversification and growth of 
the African economies so as to strengthen them within the world economy, reduce their 
vulnerability to external shocks, increase their dynamism, internalise the process of development 
and enhance self-reliance. This extended the 'compact principle' of the UN-PAAERD, and 
further diverged from the World Bank plans through its stress on self-reliance. 
Though largely unsuccessful, a follow up mechanism to UN-NADAF, the UN Inter-Agency Task 
Force on African Economic Recovery, which included all UN agencies, the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU), the African Development Bank, and which was chaired by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), was subsequently established. In addition, a 
Panel of High Level Personalities on African Development was set up by the Secretary-General 
and, as reinforcement of the UN's System-Wide Plan of Action for African Economic Recovery 
and Development, a Special Co-ordinator for Africa and other Least Developed Countries was 
appointed in the Department of Policy Co-ordination within the UN secretariat. The formerly 
mentioned System-Wide process also resulted in the 1996 launching of a UN Special Initiative 
on Africa. Within this, five UN working groups, focusing on water problems, food security, 
governance, social and human development and resource mobilisation respectively, were 
employed . 
. i" United Nations, 'Final review and appraisal of the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action for 
African Economic Recovery Development', www.un.org 
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Although the UN has to a large extent played a mediating role between the DMS and the African 
Development Agenda, recently, at the Monterrey UN Conference on Financing for Development, 
it has been accused of surrendering to the economic liberalism of the Bretton Woods 
institutions. 38 While no new proposals achieved a consensus, the UN did endorse and therefore 
strengthen the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. This occurred despite the 
heavy criticism the HIPC Initiative has received for giving creditor nations a particularly 
restrictive reign on debtor countries. 
Summary 
Unlike the World Bank, the UN places a distinctive emphasis on 'partnership'. Thus, in the 
preface for UN-NADAF, the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the whole of the General 
Assembly on the Review and Appraisal of UN-PAARERD lays emphasis on the "shared 
responsibility and full partnership" between Africa and the intemational community. The recent 
World Summit on Sustainable Development that was held in August and September 2002 
similarly made this a central theme. It is important to point out that this does not imply making 
binding commitments. Rather, it involves joint effort and joint responsibility. It is also worth 
highlighting the distinction between rhetoric and reality. While development policies may claim 
to be forging a partnership rather than adhering to the donor-recipient model, it is difficult for the 
shift to be made beyond rhetoric. In the case of the UN, its rhetoric of partnership fails to bring it 
out of the neo-liberal camp. Like the World Bank it has failed to bring Africa out of its 
development crisis; its plans have largely been unsuccessful and it has endorsed DMS dominated 
initiatives. 
(c) African led development efforts 
The power structures that have long since dictated development policies in Africa have 
responded to criticism by urging Africa to forge their own indigenous development strategies and 
policies. This view was expressed in the Denver Summit of the Group of Seven (now Eight) 
most industrialised countries. It has also been articulated in the Economist in an article entitled 
.,k AdedejL A .. 'From Lagos to Ncpad: Keynote address at thc African Scholars' Forum on Emerging initiatives 
Towards a New vision for Africa'. Nairobi April 2002. in New Agcnda:South African Jollmal of Social and 
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'Emerging Africa,.39 However, far from being a well-founded criticism, such views can be seen 
as rhetorical methods to avert blame. Indeed, the African continent has made several attempts 
since the early 1970's in this vein, which have been largely blocked by the IFIs and the donor 
community. As Adebayo Adedeji, one of the continent's leading development activists, 
comments: 
"While African leaders can be faulted in many ways, they have made a series of heroic efforts 
since the early 1970's to craft their own indigenous development paradigms in light of their own 
perceptions." 40 
The Charter of the OAU represents a turning point in African history. It stands as a culmination 
of decades of Pan-African unity and struggle against colonialism. In the post Independence 
period, the OAU has pursued a wealth of development declarations and initiatives, echoing the 
fact that African leaders quickly recognised that Independence was meaningless without 
economic emancipation. A decade after the OAU's establishment and towards the end of the 
liberation struggles on the continent, Africa was thus among the regions that initiated the 1973 
demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). This campaign included issues on 
trade, aid, investment, the international monetary system and institutional reform. It called for 
reforms of the existing order so that it could be made more favourable to developing countries. 
Responding to the rise of new protectionism amongst the developed countries, the developing 
countries sought the reversal of the declining terms of trade and the establishment of a fairer 
trading system. Mechanisms such as index-linking were pushed as a means to link the prices of 
primary products to the prices of manufactured goods so that the producers of primary products 
would not be so vulnerable and disadvantaged in the global trading system. Increased aid, 
regulation for foreign investment, representation in international economic institutions, and 
sovereignty over economic matters, natural resources, and the establishment of cartels in light of 
OPEC's success were also pushed. Ultimately, while many industrialised countries displayed 
signs of sympathy for the developing countries' plight, governments failed to act on the 
programme of the NIEO in the 1970's. In the West, it was quickly rejected by the major 
industrial powers and labelled communist. The subsequent decade proved no better, with the rise 
of Ronald Regan in the US, Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Helmut Khol in 
Economic Policy, Issue 8, Fourth Quarter 2002, South Africa, pAO 
N 'Emerging Africa', The Economist, 12 June 1997 
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Western Germany determining a laissez faire economic mood that was still less receptive to the 
developing countries' cause. 
Given the rejection of the NIEO, and in light of rising distress in Africa, the 1970's witnessed 
significant moves by African leaders to try and address the development dilemma of the 
continent through inward looking regional development policies for the transformation and 
development of African economies. The first major attempt was the "Declaration on Co-
operation, Development and Economic Independence" adopted by the OAU in 1973. This put 
forward a strategy for incremental disengagement of Africa from the world economy, based on a 
framework of individual and collective self-reliance. It also laid the basis for another Declaration 
adopted by the OAU Heads of State and Government in 1973: the Kinshasa Declaration on the 
Principle of the Establishment of an African Economic Community. 
After five years of little headway, a venture pursued by the 16th OAU Summit in July 1979 called 
for an accelerated implementation of the 1973 Declarations, which in tum led to the adoption of 
the Monrovia Declaration or Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa. This 
paved the foundation for Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) that was adopted a year later (1980) by the 
OAU Assembly Heads of State and Government at a Special Economic Summit in Nigeria. This 
set out a development agenda for the continent in the 1980's and towards the tum of the century. 
Based on the belief that the "same determination that has virtually rid our continent of political 
domination is required for our economic liberation,,41, the LP A was grounded on two key 
principles: collective self-reliance and self-sustaining development, and economic growth. In its 
words: 
"Africa must cultivate the virtue of self reliance. This is not to say that the continent should 
totally cut itself off from outside contributions. However, these outside contributions should 
only supplement our own effort; they should not be the mainstay of our development." 
The Final Act of Lagos, in its 'Plan of Action', developed an integration agenda, which laid the 
basis for the Abuja Treaty of 1991. Although the philosophy of the LPA was essentially African, 
411 Adedeji. A.. 'From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African Development and the Final Act of 
Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Whither Africa?'. Keynote Address at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa. 
Nairobi. Kenya. 26-29 April 2002. p.3 
41 Lagos Plan of Action. Lagos. Nigeria. April 1980. Preamble. Point 13 
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it fell short of providing the necessary resources for its implementation and thus it was dependent 
upon the goodwill and commitment of the international community for its implementation. 
During the 1980's, the lack of implementation of the LP A raised concern and led to the 
establishment of a Steering Committee of OAU member states to come up with a means for this. 
Working in an alliance with the Secretariat of the ECA, the APPER was proposed to the UN 
General Assembly by the then Chair of the Steering Committee, Julius Nyerere, who was also 
charged with preparing the second session of the Assembly that was devoted to Africa's social 
and economic problems. This differed from the previous declarations adopted by the OAU 
Heads of State and Government as it laid out a specific programme for the improvement of living 
conditions for the majority of Africa's inhabitants. The adoption of the APPER in 1985 
constituted an attempt to revive the LP A after five years of unsuccessful implementation, 
committed the OAU to mobilising the international community through the United Nations to 
address Africa's plight, and identified Africa's debt burden as challenge. Although the 
convening of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TIC AD) can be seen 
as an effect of APPER, resources for implementation of the LP A again failed to materialise and 
thus its implementation remained on the shelf. Other African attempts to craft self development 
plans included the OAU 1987 Declaration on the "African Common Position on Africa's 
External Debt Crisis" and the 1989 "African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment 
Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation" (AAF-SAP), which articulated 
a rejection of World Bank's SAPs. However, these too failed to offer a package that was 
equipped to lift Africa from its development plight. 
In light of the end of the cold war, which detracted the major powers' attention away from 
Africa, and given the successive failure of development initiatives, resolve among African 
leaders to develop inward looking strategies for Africa's economic and social development 
strengthened. In the first half of the 1990's the OAU Assembly Heads of State and Government 
thus adopted a series of policy documents to raise resources from the international community 
for the social and economic transformation of the continent. At this time, Africa's development 
thinking was undergoing a shift towards one that focuses on democracy, good governance and 
the protection of human and people's rights. This is conveyed in the 1990 Declaration on 
'Fundamental Changes taking place in the World and Africa's Response', within which the 
importance of good governance was held up as paramount. Popular participation and public 
private partnerships also gained precedence in African development thinking at this time. This is 
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evident in the OAU's adoption of the African Charter for Popular Participation in 1990. For the 
first time African leaders recognised the role of civil society and grass roots organisations in 
African development. In many ways, this was built on and served to further the work of the 
Charter on Human and People's Rights, which was adopted in 1981 in Banjul, Gambia. It also 
demonstrates the ascending focus of human rights in African development thinking. 
Another landmark for Africa's development came in 1991 when the 0 A U Summit adopted the 
Abuja Treaty, which set in motion the establishment of an African Economic Community (AEC). 
Aimed at furthering the LP A and the Final Act of Lagos' vision of regional integration, it sought 
to create an AEC by 2025. Indicative of dominant development thinking, this initiative adopted 
a market integration approach for the 34-year long linear process of forming the AEC. In 
accordance with the prevailing African Development Agenda discourse, it also set out the 
principle of solidarity and collective self-reliance, protection of human rights, accountability and 
popular participation. Further OAU development efforts that focused on 'partnership', are 
evident in the "Relaunching Africa's Economic and Social Development: The Cairo Agenda for 
Action" and the "Cairo Plan of Action" in 1995, which anticipated a "compact" between Africa 
and its development partners. 
In a furthcr drive to give Africa's development fresh impetus, African leaders established the 
African Union as a successor arrangement to the four-decade old OAD. Despite numerous 
efforts, the OAU had failed to adequately address the continent's development challenge, in at 
least as much as it did not bring Africa out of its development crisis. Its legislative means to 
grapple with the development challenge, laid down in Article II (b) of its charter, identifies one 
of the objectives of the OAU as being "to co-ordinate and intensify their [African states'] co-
operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa".42 Essentially, however, 
its objective and focus were more geared for political unity and de-colonisation than the tackling 
the continent's more recent development challenges. This proved a major shortcoming. In an 
effort to address this and to more radically reform the OAU, it was replaced in 2000 with the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union. This moderates the sovereignty and non-interference 
emphasis of the OAU, transforms it institutionally, and broadens its mandate to include a 
development, human rights and democracy as well as peace and security focus. It also seeks to 
revise the time frames of the Abuja Treaty (adopted by the OAU) and redirect the focus of 
J2 OAU Charter. Addis Abbaba, Ethiopia. 25 May 1963. Article II (b) 
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regional integration from an economics / market integration dominated focus to a more political 
one. 
As the African Union (AU) was being launched, the NEPAD initiative also emerged. The direct 
lead up to NEPAD comes from an OAU mandate given in 1999 to Algerian President Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika and South African president Thabo Mbeki to lead a project to end Africa's economic 
disempowerment. At the G77 Summit in 2000, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo was 
added to the group. Their efforts led to the formulation, predominantly by President Mbeki, of 
the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme (MAP) that was launched in early 
2001. 
Another programme for African renewal that was to feed into NEP AD was the Omega Plan, 
devised by President Wade of Senegal and first presented to the French-Africa Summit in 
Cameroon in January 2001. Omega identified plans for what it considered the four most 
important primary sectors - agriculture, education, health and infrastructure. It also envisioned 
the drafting and implementation of specific action plans for each of these domains in each of the 
fi ve African regions. 
Compared to MAP, Omega was more far reaching. It put forward a hierarchy to embrace the 
many facets of development, conflict resolution, governance, aid, investment and debt. Despite 
their differences, these two development plans, sharing many core tenets, were amalgamated on 
the 3 July 2001 to form the New African Initiative (NAI). While this kept the MAP structure and 
most of its language, a regional component was added to the management of the initiative to 
accommodate the Omega Plan. Having been endorsed by the G8 members on 20 July 2001, the 
policy framework was then finalised by the Heads of State Implementation Committee (HSIC) 
on 23 October 2001, signalling the formation ofNEPAD. 
Given that past African grown development efforts have by and large failed, it is important to 
assess the causes of this so as to offer a more clear picture of the challenges that NEP AD faces. 
A variety of both internal and external factors explain the failure of past development efforts. 
Endemic problems of poor governance, corruption, limited capacity, lack of political will, and 
unstable and externally dependent economies within Africa are partly responsible. The main 
driver of past African development initiatives, the OAU, is also answerable through the fact that 
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it failed to sufficiently adapt, both in reality and in its public image, to the post decolonisation 
imperatives. In addition, the initiatives themselves demonstrated flaws often failing to provide 
the necessary resources and specific programmes for their implementation. Even initiatives, such 
as the APPER, that did explicitly recognise the need for these, fell short in this regard. 
Interlinked to the problem of raising resources and given the prevailing force driving 
development, the theoretical underpinnings of the African development initiatives helps account 
for their failure. 
As mentioned earlier, the prevailing force driving development has been the OMS. This has 
acted as the framework within which the donor countries of the West have had the greater power 
to shape development policy. The latter's power has come from their superior source of 
finances, their influence in the major international financial/development institutions and their 
influence on the world economic and political stage. Thus they have had the means, which 
ultimately underpins the potential for the success of development initiatives. Given the need for 
donor support, largely because of Africa's need for financial backing in development initiatives, 
the donor governments and institutions have been able to push their interests to the front. In this 
way, African governments have been pressured to conform to OMS interests. It may be argued 
that the failure of Africa's home-grown development initiatives is largely due to the fact they did 
not sufficiently tow the OMS line, resulting in inadequate financial backing. 
It is apparent that the development strategies emanating from Africa are marked with recognition 
that the OMS is inappropriate for Africa. For example, the 1976 Revised Framework of 
Principles for the Implementation of the New International Order in Africa propounded that an 
appropriate development strategy for Africa would be one that satisfies four fundamental 
principles - self-reliance, self-sustainment, democratisation of the development process, and a 
fair and just distribution of the benefits of development through the progressive eradication of 
unemployment and poverty. Many of the development initiatives emanating from Africa adhere 
to these principles, which differ from the World Bank and OMS focus, particularly its two-gap 
model of economic growth. This adds weight to the argument that in failing to sufficiently tow 
the OMS line, donor commitment to Africa's 'home grown' development efforts was never fully 
realised, and the efforts were thus largely unsuccessful. Consequently, external factors, notably 
the OMS and IFls may be seen as playing a major role in the failure of Africa's home grown 
development efforts. 
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Summary 
Africa has made a series of horne grown efforts to take charge of its development challenge. The 
OAU, as the mainstay of African development initiatives, endorsed an array of declarations and 
development plans such as the NIEO, the Kinshasa and the Monrovia Declarations, the LP A, the 
APPER, the AAF-SAP, the Abuja Treaty and the Cairo Plan of Action. 
An analysis of Africa's development initiatives shows that collectively they tend to focus on 
inward looking strategies that emphasise self-reliance and self-sustaining development, as well as 
economic growth. They place a focus on democracy, good governance, the protection of human 
and people's rights, popular participation, public private partnerships, the concept of partnership 
and a compact between Africa and its development partners. In addition, they tend to recognise 
the need for civil society and grass roots organisations to playa role in Africa's development. 
The failure of Africa's development efforts can be attributed to both internal and external factors. 
Internally, poor governance, corruption, limited capacity, lack of political will, and unstable and 
externally dependent economies within Africa have hindered suceess. The initiatives themselves 
often failed to provide the necessary programmes and resources for implementation, which is 
connected both to their need to adhere to the OMS as well as to the fact that they did not bend 
towards it enough to gain sufficient donor commitment. Further external forces, especially 
unequal terms of trade played their part. 
In recognition of some of the reasons for failure, the AU replaced the OAD. The AU may be 
seen as a new initiative in itself. It places a more explicit focus on development than the OAU. 
It moderates the sovereignty and non-interference emphasis of the latter, transforms it 
institutionally, and broadens its mandate to include a development, human rights and democracy 
as well as peace and security focus. Similarly, NEPAD, which will be discussed in more detail 
in the ensuing chapter seeks to redress the problems of past development initiatives. 
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Section Conclusion 
A wealth of development initiatives have tried and failed to redress Africa's development 
dilemma. There are distinct differences between the development thinking and policies of the 
World Bank and those coming out of Africa. On the one hand, the World Bank continues to 
push neo-liberalism and the two-gap model of economic development, despite its more recent 
efforts to bridge the divergence of interests between the imperatives of economic growth and 
poverty alleviation through its alliance with post-modernism. On the other hand, the indigenous 
African development agenda places a stress on the goals of poverty alleviation, self-reliance, and 
self-sustainability. The UN lies somewhere in-between the two poles, trying to act as a vehicle 
through which to bridge the gap between donor and recipient interests. Essentially, the donor 
interests fail to draw sufficient support from the African governments and continue in a policy 
direction, which in its application has been proved unable to bring sufficient tangible benefits to 
the recipient countries and ultimately has failed to bring them out of their development crises. 
The African led development efforts have failed to attract sufficient support from the donor 
communities and have also been unable to overcome internal obstacles such as widespread 
corruption. Further, the UN has failed in bridging a compromise. Despite its rhetoric for 
'partnership' it has failed to sufficiently move beyond the neo-liberal camp in practice. It has its 
own internal problems, not least its vast bureaucracy, which have also limited its ability to fuel 
change in Africa. The question this begs is to what extent NEP AD differs from what has gone 
before. 
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SECTION 4 
NEPAD IN PERSPECTIVE 
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Section Introduction 
This section will provide a more in depth investigation into NEPAD. Firstly, an exploration of 
the plan's general structure and strategy, which is constituted by a three-tiered response to 
Africa's development dilemma, will be made. Secondly, its broad policy areas, in terms of 
infrastructure provision, human resources development, market access, capital resources and 
governance and stability, will be reviewed. Thirdly, the two core methods by which NEPAD 
proposes to achieve its goals will be analysed. Fourthly, the management structure will be 
critically looked at. These chapters will incorporate a discussion regarding the extent to which 
NEPAD differs from previous development efforts, how it responds to past failures and calls for 
change in the focus of development initiatives. In its introduction NEPAD makes the claim that: 
"it is African developed, managed and owned: it brings the concept ofa 'new' partnership (with 
mutual commitments, obligations, interests, contributions and benefits); and Africa is 
undertaking certain commitments and obligations in its own interests which are not externally 
imposed conditionalities,,43. 
This claim suggests that NEPAD is African owned and that it differs from the development 
initiatives that have preceded it. However, it will be argued here that NEP AD is not wholly 
African owned and that despite making a shift in the focus of development, it continues to follow 
the donor led OMS agenda. The compatibility between the OMS and the African development 
agenda will also be analysed. This will lead to a more broad ranging discussion regarding the 
relevance ofNEPAD in light of the development dynamic. 
~.1 NEPAD. Annexure B, 'Introducing the New Partnership for Africa's Development, Parliamentary Papers, Cape 
Town. South Africa 
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(a) General structure and strategy 
The NEPAD document outlines a three-tiered response to Africa's underdevelopment and 
strategic vision for how to achieve sustainable development in Africa. Each of the tiers offers 
specific aims and actions to be undertaken. In this way, it offers more guidance regarding its 
implementation than past African-led development initiatives. Some of the most important 
elements of NEPAD are in its first tier, 'conditions for sustainable development', which consists 
of three initiatives: 'the Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance Initiative' 
(PSDGI), 'the Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative' (ECGI), and 'sub-regional and 
regional approaches to deve1opment'.44 This tier provides for the management of globalisation 
and governance of the economy, which is noted as a shortfall in Africa. Within it, the third 
initiative, 'sub-regional and regional approaches to development', is important as it underpins the 
functioning of the other two governance initiatives. The Peace and Security Initiative aims to 
promote long-term peace through developing regional and sub-regional organisations to mediate 
conflicts, intervene effectively as peacekeepers and design programs for post-conflict peace-
building.45 The Democracy and Good Governance Initiative seeks to codify the core values to be 
observed by African leaders. Some such values include: constitutional democracy; the rule of 
law; the separation of powers; the independence of the judiciary; fixed terms in office; impartial, 
transparent and credible electoral administration and oversight systems; more efficient civil 
services and the curbing of corruption. It also seeks to engender the necessary political will to 
adhere to such norms and values. It aims to empower African civil society groups to hold their 
governments accountable, and ensure the effective participation of women, minorities and other 
disadvantaged groups in Africa's political and economic processes.46 The Economic and 
Corporate Governance Initiative is based on the belief that institutions that offer transparency and 
accountability best ensure the development of a viable private sector.47 The idea is that each 
member state will propose its own plan to meet the range ofNEPAD objectives. 
Under the overall strategy of promoting sub-regional and continental economIC integration 
through its political and economic initiatives, NEP AD's second tier, 'Sectoral Priorities', 
prioritises six areas: bridging the infrastructure gap, human resource development, agriculture, 
44 NEPAD. October 2001. Department of Foreign Affairs. \vww.dfa.gov.za 
-I~ NEP AD. October 2001, Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Peace and Security Initiative' paragraphs 
www.dfa.gov.za. 
-1[' NEPAD, "Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance", 18 June, 2002, paragraphs 
7-15. www.sarpn.org.za 
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environment, culture, and sCience and technology.48 First, African leaders aIm to bridge the 
continent's infrastructure gap by closing the digital divide between Africa and the more 
developed countries and by investing in information and communications, technologies, energy, 
transport, water and sanitation. Second, the human resources development sectoral priority 
strives to reverse Africa's 'brain drain' , reduce poverty, close in on the education gap, and direct 
investments into health, agriculture, the environment, culture, science and technology. Third, 
NEP AD's agriculture policy aims to bring down structural and institutional fences that obstruct 
private investment in this sector so as to increase the productivity of African farmers. Fourth, 
NEPAD's environmental agenda seeks to address such issues as the reduction of desertification, 
the preservation of wetlands, the effective use of coastal resources, and the creation of supporting 
institutions and regulations for Africa's environment. Fifth, NEPAD stresses the importance of 
preserving and promoting Africa's indigenous culture. Finally, NEPAD's science and 
technology sectoral priority aims to provide for the development of cutting edge information and 
expertise as a means to provide growth in the manufacturing and industrial sectors. 
The third tier is constituted by the capital flows and market access initiatives that seek to 
mobilise broad resources to provide the means of realising NEP AD's sectoral priorities. The 
capital flows initiative aims to encourage domestic resource mobilisation, debt relief and 
cancellation, the reform and increase of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), private 
capital flows and foreign direct investment. The market access initiative promotes 
diversification of production and increase of access in the areas of: agriCUlture, mining, 
manufacturing, tourism and services. NEPAD also aims to support the development of Africa's 
private sector, to increase African exports and eliminate non-tariff barriers to African products.49 
Summary 
NEP AD offers a relatively clear, in depth general structure and strategy, which responds in 
theory to Africa's development needs and the failure of past development initiatives. Specific 
aims and actions are set out, which in itself illustrates a response to the failure of many past 
·17 NEPAD. "Declaration on Democracy, Political. Economic and Corporate Governance", 18 June, 2002, paragraphs 
16-19. www.sarpn.org.za 
-I~ NEPAD. Section B, "Sectoral Priorities", October 2001, Department of Foreign Affairs, www.dfa.gov.za 
-I') NEPAD, Section C. "Mobilising Resources", October 2001, Department of Foreign Affairs, -'-'-'-'~=b=":'= 
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initiatives to offer sufficient guidance for carrying plans through to implementation. The extent 
to which NEPAD is African owned and influenced by the DMS and the African development 
agenda will be explored in more detail later in the chapter. 
b) Broad Policy Areas 
From the NEPAD document several broad policy areas can be drawn out - infrastructure 
provision, human resources development, capital resources and market access, and governance 
and stability. They may be read as the major obstacles to African development and thus, in 
particular need of attention within the NEP AD strategy for African development. 
(i) Infrastructure 
Infrastructure is an important focus area for NEP AD as roads, ports, railway lines and 
telecommunications networks can link suppliers, producers and consumers, and are necessary to 
increase productivity and trade by lowering costs and improving production capabilities. The 
envisioned chain of effects is that increased productivity will increase return opportunities, which 
will attract increased FDI. The expansion of infrastructure networks would better link the region 
together physically and economically and in so doing this would boost regional integration, 
which would also strengthen the region's voice in pushing for more favourable terms within the 
global economic and political system. In some ways, NEP AD's infrastructure policy may be 
seen to envision development in a neo-liberal framework where economic growth and further 
integration into the world market through infrastructure provision is paramount. However, 
efforts to improve infrastructure also support the African development agenda goals of making 
Africa better integrated as a region and more able to be self-reliant. 
(ii) Human resources 
Human resources are also a key focus of NEPAD. Two aspects of human resources are drawn 
out as particularly problematic. Firstly, continent wide diseases such as HIV and malaria are 
highlighted as they kill 2.5 million and 2 million people globally a year and affect Africa more 
h h . 'i0 t an any ot er contment.- Secondly, the brain drain is noted as a major problem, as this 
phenomenon sees the departure of one of Africa's key means to furthering its development aims-
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its skilled labour. Instead of their skills igniting economic growth at home, 30% of Africa's 
"highly skilled workforce" has been lost. 51 Africa spends precious resources educating and 
training people, only to see them disappear to developed nations, which already have a relative 
abundance of skilled workers. The effect is that 100 000 expatriates work in Africa at a cost of 
$4 billion per year and this excludes the opportunity cost of lost entrepreneurial skill. 52 Doctors 
and engineers who leave for lucrative jobs in more stable countries are acting rationally and 
under their own choice. At the same time, as the countries receiving this massive transfer of 
wealth from poor to rich countries accept the skilled workers, the unskilled labour that is prolific 
in Africa are largely denied entry into the developed countries. Similar to the case of cut-price I 
generic drugs, where their provision would serve as a large-scale public good, but where this 
often fails to materialise because no actor has a responsibility or an incentive to provide for them, 
vested or national interest is shown to underscore the current development system. NEPAO 
recognises the priority of improving education and the skills base in Africa, and reversing the 
'brain drain', so as to better achieve its goals of self-reliance, self-sustainment, poverty 
alleviation and economic growth. 
(iii) Procurement of capital resources and market access 
Procurement of capital resources is central to NEPAO's ability to attain its development goals. 
In particular, to achieve its goal of 7% GDP growth rate, it claims that "Africa needs to fill an 
annual resource gap of 12% of its GOP" some $64 billion per year. 53 Such high levels of 
growth have previously only occurred in a very specific historical context, namely in the post 
World War Two economic boom. 
NEPAO envisages that in the long term Africa's capital requirements need to be met through 
investment, either from domestic savings or FDI. This call comes in the face of daunting 
challenges, not least poor returns. Mills and Oppenheimer describe that: 
:'(1 • Aid for A IDS', The Economist, London, 27 April 2000 
<I Mills, G .. and Oppenheimer. J .. 'Making Africa Succeed', in Gibb. R .. Hughes. T .. Mills. G .. and Vaahtoranta, T .. 
(cds.), Charting a New Course: Globalisation. African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative. South African 
Institute of International Affairs. Johannesburg, 2002, p.93 
Mills. G .. and Oppenheimer, J., 'Making Africa Sueceed'. in Gibb. R., Hughes. T .. Mills. G .. and Vaahloranta. T., 
(eds.). Charting a New Course: Globalisation. African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative. South African 
Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2002. p.93 
',1 NEPAD. October 2001, Department of Foreign Affairs. paragraph 147 
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"A combination of poor infrastructure, distant geographical location, low productivity and a 
high-risk environment led to lower returns (around one-third of the global average) on capital 
investments between 1960 and 1990". 54 
Investments and savings in Africa have declined since 1970, and many African countries have 
the lowest savings rate in the world.55 37% of Africa's wealth lies overseas, compared with 3% 
for East Asia.56 In the 1990s, $19.8 billion in FDI left Africa for other markets, including $12.4 
billion from South Africa.57 While FDI outflows have been increasing, FDI inflows decreased 
rapidly from 28% of total developing countries' FDI in 1980 to only 7% in 2000 with an inflow 
of $6.7 billion. 58 
Foreign investment is deterred by several factors, such as limited knowledge of overseas markets, 
political and economic uncertainty in light of threats from nationalisation, corruption, unstable 
inflation rates, tariff regulations and foreign exchange restrictions. Financial and investment 
flows also tend to be based on trends such as the Asian "miracle", which collapsed in 1997 after 
a "self-validating panic" amongst investment funds caused the latter to pull their money out of 
the region in response to the crisis in Thailand59. Investors tend to lump together developing 
countries or "emerging markets" and they are often prone to this panic and euphoria, which 
makes the levels of investment and the value of currencies far over- and under-shoot their real 
worth.6o In the African context, there is a general lack of confidence or "Afro-pessimism" in 
African markets, regardless of any real value. This is evident in The Economist article dated 11 
May 2000 and titled "Hopeless Africa". NEPAD seeks to redress this negative perception, and to 
counter the forces, which deter foreign investment. 
q Mills. G" and Oppenheimer. J .• 'Making Africa Succeed'. in Gibb. R .. Hughes. T .• Mills. G., and Vaahtoranta. T.. 
(eds.). Charting a New Course: Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative. South African 
Institute of International Affairs. Johannesburg. 2002, p.93 
5' Pahad. A .. 'The New Partnership for Africa's Development', in Gibb, R., Hughes, T., Mills, G" and Vaahtoranta, 
T .. (eds.). Charting a New Course: Globalisation. African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative. South African 
Institute of International Affairs. Johannesburg, 2002, p.] 
'i. Collier and Gunning cited in Gibb, R., 'Globalisation and African Economic Recovery: Compatibility or 
Contradiction'?' in Gibb, R .. Hughes, T., Mills. G .. and Vaahtoranta, T., (cds.). ~"-'-'-'-'-'-l:>-'''-'-'--''-'-'--==~''-'­
Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative, South African Institute of International Affairs, 
Johannesburg, 2002, p.12 
5
C United Nations Economic Council for Africa (UN ECA), Globalisation and Liberalisation of African Exports, 
African Development Bank. African Development Report, Addis Ababa: African Development Bank, 2000, p.138 
,q Krugman. P., The Return of Depression Economics, New York/London: Norton, 1999, pp.97-98 
(,I) Gilpin, R.. Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2000, p.331 
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To attract foreign investment and to improve home-grown resources, NEPAD focuses on 
reforming foreign aid delivery systems, attracting increased aid, achieving debt relief and 
improving market access. It calls for acceleration of the IMF's HI PC Initiative and raising of 
official ODA levels to 0.7% of GOP for developed countries. This is particularly challenging 
given that ODA levels have been falling in recent years. 61 Since 1992 ODA flows to Africa have 
dropped more than one fifth in real terms. 62 After growing at an annual rate of 6.9% over the 
period 1985-1989, ODA to Africa fell by 3.4% (annual rate) in the 1990s, falling from a peak of 
$27 billion in 1990 to $18 billion in 1997 (1995 prices).63 The challenge of using this aid to 
further development goals is an added challenge. According to the World Bank, US$1 billion of 
aid lifted 105,000 people above the absolute poverty line64 in 1990 and in 1997-1998 the same 
sum of aid lifted still only 284,000 people out of poverty.65 The implication is that after fifty 
years of supposed development experience only a small percentage of the money given in aid 
goes directly to the people who need it most. Additional to the negative effects of the conditions 
attached to some aid donations, which will be discussed in more detail later, the political pressure 
on governments to undertake necessary reforms of their economies can also be directly diffused 
by aid. More specifically, the money from aid is in some cases used to make purchases that 
should ordinarily come out of the annual state budget. Corruption, which is commonly invoked 
as prolific in Africa, can thus distort the value aid can provide to development needs. 
NEPAD also identifies that increased FDI and aid needs to come hand in hand with debt relief 
and increased trade access in order to maximise the benefits for Africa's development. Debt in 
Africa is a major drain on development opportunities. Excessive borrowing from banks or donor 
countries, on hard-to-say-no terms after Independence, to buy oil and arms, to balance payment 
deficits, and to finance big infrastructure projects, saw the siphoning off of large sums of money 
by corrupt officials. President Mobutu of ZaIre is said to have amassed in this way a fortune of 
$5 billion. 66 As mentioned earlier, the costs of servicing African debts increased dramatically 
61 According to UN statistics, in 1992 ODA stood at about 0.35% of GOP while in 200 I it had dropped to 0.22%. 
6c Pahad, A., 'The New Partnership for Africa's Development', in Gibb, R., Hughes, T., Mills, G., and Vaahtoranta, 
T .. (eds.). Charting a New Course: Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative. South African 
Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2002, p.3 
6.1 Statistics taken from a World Bank report that was requested by US Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil. 
See Herbert. R .. 'Implementing Nepad: A Critical Assessment', South African Institute of International Affairs-
Paper, 24 June 2002 p.19 
6-1 This is taken to be US$ I per day in income 
(,' Statistics taken from a World Bank report that was requested by US Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil. 
See Herbert. R .. 'Implementing Nepad: A Critical Assessment', South African Institute of International Affairs-
Paper. 24 June 2002 p.19 
(,(, Bond, P .. Against Global Apartheid: South Africa Meets the Word Bank, IMF, and International Capital, Cape 
Town: UCT Press. 2001, p.60 
56 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
wn
when American interest rates rose to deal with the stagflation of the 1970s and as a result of the 
demise of the Bretton Woods agreements on fixed exchange rates. This led to the depreciation of 
African currencies and the local currency value of the loans soared. The real exchange rate index 
in Africa fell from 107.5 (1990=100) during 1985-89 to 84.3 during 1995-98 - a drop of 22%.67 
Thus, in 2000 sub-Saharan Africa was faced with making a $10.2 billion payment in debt 
servicing. 68 Many African countries are heavily indebted so much so that the debt exceeds the 
entire GDP and the debt service requirement exceeds 25% of total export earnings.69 Debt 
cancellation is based on the belief that African people should not be made to pay for the excesses 
of corrupt rulers like Mobutu, especially given the support such leaders received from the West, 
and given the limited political and ethical consideration from banks and lending institutions that 
supplied the capital to such governments. Moreover, it is argued that the opportunity costs of the 
amounts owed are much lower for the financial institutions and wealthy countries than they are 
for African states and their people. 
Market access is also a central development focus of NEP AD. African economies tend to suffer 
from the negative effects of over reliance on a single commodity. For example, 99% of Nigeria's 
export earnings and 87% of Botswana's are earned from two commodities. 70 Added to this 
problem is the global oversupply of many of Africa's core resources and a corresponding decline 
in world prices. Africa's share of world trade faces serious decline. Despite its abundance of 
natural resources, Africa only constitutes 2% of world trade and without South Africa this figure 
drops by 0.8% to only 1.2% of world trade. 71 There are a variety of causes, from the colonial 
economics to poor governance. There is equally a wealth of possible solutions, from diversifying 
production and improving Africa's technological advancement to pushing for the abolition of 
disadvantageous trade distortions. One of NEPAD's key goals is to provide effective strategies 
to reverse market access related problems. While in some ways this adheres to the African 
development agenda, the fact that NEP AD seeks to be better integrated into the international 
economic system can also be taken as evidence of its adherence to the neo-liberal DMS agenda. 
6' World Bank, African Development Indicators, 2000, p.52 
6S World Bank, African Development Indicators, 2000 
(,0 Pahad, A" 'The New Partnership for Africa's Development', in Gibb, R .. Hughes, T., Mills, G., and Vaahtoranta. 
T" (eds.). Charting a New Course: Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative, South African 
Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2002, p.3 
'0 United Nations Economic Council for Africa (UNECA), Globalisation and Liberalisation of African Exports, 
www.uneca.org 
'I Pahad. A" 'The New Partnership for Africa's Development', in Gibb, R., Hughes. T., Mills, G., and Vaahtoranta, 
T., (cds.), Charting a New Course: Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative, South African 
Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2002, p.3 
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Past development initiatives have called for increased aid, debt relief and market access without 
much success. NEP AD recognises the need for further efforts on a variety of fronts, particularly 
the need to diversify production and address Africa's shortcomings in areas such as 
infrastructure, education and health, which it seeks to do through a variety of programmes, and to 
craft an environment where peace, stability, freedom, good governance, and respect of human 
rights can flourish. NEP AD also articulates a need for a deal or partnership between Africa and 
the donors. While past African and donor-led development initiatives have claimed and sought a 
balanced partnership, it has, as yet, not been successfully achieved. The notion of partnership is 
a controversial pivot for NEPAD. It is on this issue that its claim to be African led, managed and 
owned, conflicts with pressure from the DMS to bow to its interests. The precariousness of this 
balance and goal is discussed in more detail with reference to the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM). 
(iv) Governance 
More than past development initiatives in Africa, NEP AD focuses strongly on governance, to 
both redress its 'negative' role through efforts to reduce the de stabilising or unfair social and 
political environments, and to strengthen its 'positive' role through efforts to increase the 
provision of public goods, socio-economic planning and to help in the reduction of conflicts. In 
200 1 some form of armed conflict affected eleven states on the continent. 72 
Improvement in governance is fundamental to efforts to work against the destructive phenomena 
of leadership by self-interested or authoritarian elites, who use the institutions of the state as their 
personal fiefdom to steal the state's wealth and/or remain in power, regardless of the broader 
social and economic costs to the country, its people and the region/continent. The case of 
Zimbabwe, where the economy has plummeted and poverty has dramatically risen, illustrates the 
negative consequences of this kind of leadership. Transparency International's '200 1 Corruption 
Perception Index' ranks 91 countries on their perceived levels of corruption. The best-ranked 
African country is Botswana, which takes 26th position, scoring 6 out of 10. At the bottom of the 
table with scores of less than 3 out of 10 are Senegal, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, 
Cameroon, Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria. 73 This survey excludes failed states like Democratic 
72 Nagan, W., "Post-Conflict Governance: Preventing Future Conflict and Ensuring Development", in Gibb, R., 
Hughes. T .. Mills. G., and Vaahtoranta, T., (eds.), Charting a New Course: Globalisation. African Recovery and the 
New Africa Initiative, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2002. pp.67-89 
71 Transparency International, The 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index, www.transparency.org 
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Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia, and war zones, at the time, like Angola and Sierra 
Leone. Africa is not alone in the corruption of its public officials. Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Bolivia and Azerbaijan also perform poorly. However, corruption in Africa is so rife that the 
Economist writes, "[i]n parts of Africa, corruption, like an advanced fonn of cancer, has taken 
over the whole body". 74 NEP AD seeks to strengthen the role of governance to provide for a 
stable and fair environment for markets to work, and for people to trade and produce. It therefore 
places a strong emphasis on redressing corruption and upholding the rule of law as a means to 
achieve its other foci of providing macro-economic stability, building investor confidence, and 
providing public goods that are beyond the reach of the market. 
Summary 
NEPAD's focus in terms of its key policy areas tells a conflicting story. In most of its 
development aims and focus areas, as set out in the document's structure and strategy, NEPAD 
emphasises self reliance, self-sustainment, partnership, democratisation of the development 
process, poverty alleviation and regional integration, thereby complying with the African 
development agenda. It emphasises self-reliance through its Sectoral Priorities that aim, among 
other things, to improve Africa's infrastructure, agricultural production, education and skills 
base. It also gives attention to environmental preservation necessities, thereby demonstrating its 
adherence to the principle of self-sustainment. Partnership is pushed as a core component within 
the documents third tier, the capital flows and market access initiatives. Popular participation 
and respect for human rights is shown to be a goal within its Democracy and Good Governance 
Initiative, which aims to broaden civil society participation in Africa's political and economic 
processes. Poverty alleviation underpins the entire initiative and regional integration is given a 
large focus in many ways, in its infrastructure goals and in that it underpins the functioning of the 
two governance initiatives in the first tier. 
NEP AD also offers a greater emphasis on democracy and governance, as is evident in its first 
tier, 'conditions for sustainable development', in the Peace, Security, Democracy and Political 
Governance Initiative and the Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative. As touched on in 
the previous summary, this demonstrates that NEP AD extends on previous development efforts. 
7-1 "The Heart of the Matter", The Economist, London, 11 May 2000 
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Despite being representative of the African development agenda and despite the aforementioned 
developments on past initiatives, NEPAD does, however, continue to move in line with the OMS 
agenda. In promoting free trade, western democratic values and institutions and in its focus on 
delivering economic growth, all of which corne across most strongly in its procurement of capital 
resources and market access focus, NEP AD follows the core tenants of a paradigm that is donor 
led and has so far failed in lifting Africa out of poverty. In this way, NEP AD is not reaching far 
beyond the past development efforts, which have proved largely unsuccessful. 
(c) Methods 
Given that NEPAD's structure and strategy do not radically differ from previous development 
initiatives, it is important to assess the means through which it aims to achieve its goals. These 
means can be grouped into two categories: the bargaining and co-operation method, which 
prescribes policy co-ordination at the regional level as a means to provide public goods like 
infrastructure and to create a stronger bargaining platform from which market access and other 
agendas could be pushed; and the commitment method, which effectively stipulates that 
participating states use institutional commitment devises to build investor confidence and capital 
inflows. 
(i) The bargaining and co-operation mechanism 
The bargaining and co-operation mechanism that NEP AD aims to implement as a method of 
achieving its goals springs from the idea of regional policy co-ordination. There are two main 
avenues of regional policy co-ordination envisaged in NEP AD: to provide regional public goods, 
and to build a stronger regional bargaining and negotiating platform. The former relates to the 
need for efforts to address problems that are regional in nature, such as the HIV I A IDS pandemic 
and the need for provision of inter-regional infrastructure links. These problems can be addressed 
through co-ordination, aided by a supranational institution or mechanism to solve the co-
ordination problems that arise. The latter policy co-ordination avenue relates to a regions 
(Africa's) interaction with the world outside it. This sets the basis for the 'partnership' aspect of 
NEPAD. Africa, as a region, is faced with an international political-economic system that is 
largely unfavourable to its development needs. Combined with this, it lacks the relative power at 
the systemic level to redress this problem. NEP AD hopes to establish a stronger bargaining 
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platfonn by consolidating the power and 'voices' of the affected countries, and by tying it in with 
a larger program of African development to catch the attention of the powerful international 
actors. The assumption is that this will strengthen Africa's platfonn in the system so that it can 
better counter systemic barriers to its development, such as trade barriers. It is also assumed that 
such a move will, for example, work to redress the 'brain drain' to richer countries and benefit 
the debt cancellation project, which is aided by a moral theme. This lays emphasis on the debt 
that the rich world especially Europe and the US - owes to Africa for its part in "the historical 
impoverishment of a continent", either through colonialism, the Cold War, or "nco-colonial 
dependence". 75 In many ways, Africa occupies the moral high ground on these issues. This, 
therefore, seemingly has the potential to open up political space for negotiation. The problem 
lies in the fact that previous African initiatives have tried and failed in this regard. It is 
anticipated that through the greater success of NEP AD this mechanism can achieve success. A 
more innovative break from the shortfalls of past development initiatives is the commitment 
method, 
(ii) The commitment method 
The commitment method rests on the fact that a central problem with capital flows in tenns of 
attracting FDI or retaining domestic savings is investor confidence,76 In the African landscape, 
historical evidence of equivocation over contracts or ownership of private property combined 
with the real and perceived problem of large-scale political instability, conflict, 'creeping 
expropriation' and/or nationalization undennines investor confidence, When the investors are 
foreigners and are not represented in the political bargaining process, respect for their interests 
can be more easily flouted, Game theory highlights that unless co-operation is the equilibrium of 
a game, which it is not always in the game of investors and governments in Africa, commitment 
without a commitment device is impossible, Thus, given the unfavourable climate for investor 
confidence in Africa, and given the lessons of game theory, devices to commit governments to 
refonns and good governance are crucial components within NEPAD, The document explains 
that what is required is "a series of commitments by participating countries" and the 
"institutionalisation" of these commitments,77 These are seen as a means to strengthen 
confidence to thus keep Africa's home-grown capital and attract more, 
7, NEPAD update. 02 May 2002, paragraph 18, www.dfa.gov.za 
7" However. increasingly ODA is also being linked to recipient states' commitment to good governance 
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A commitment device is dependent upon the member states' willingness to cede some autonomy 
over certain policy areas to a supranational authority at a regional leveL This supranational 
institution would need to be able to freely monitor and investigate respect for investment 
contracts and report to the regional executive or council of ministers. There would also need to 
be a credible system of punishments for member states that breach the governance agreements. 
This institution will only instil confidence if it is politically independent of any state or 
government's influence so that its organisational goals can be perforn1ed freely. A working 
commitment device should hardly ever need to be called into action because its threat is accepted 
and therefore it acts as a deterrent to defection. A commitment mechanism is also a signalling 
device to investors, both domestic and foreign, that their capital can be trusted to the markets of a 
regIOn. 
The APRM is NEPAD's answer to the need for a commitment method for attaining its goals. 
NEPAD's vision is that the APRM will be used specifically to support the plan's three key 
initiatives: peace and security, democracy and political governance, and economic and corporate 
governance. It aims to serve as a means through which African leaders can monitor compliance 
of other African states with NEP AD's principles of political and economic governance. In doing 
this, it seeks to engineer a climate conducive to investment inflows and development. African 
heads of state have picked seven eminent Africans to serve as reviewers. They will have a pool 
of about 20 African experts to visit states under review, to talk to opposition politicians and civic 
groups and recommend any necessary action. 78 The idea is to provide a mechanism by which 
leaders on the continent can scrutinise each other's performance, identify problems and provide 
support. While heralded as a cornerstone of the plan, the issue of standard setting and 
enforcement remains one of the most controversial in NEPAD. 
Under its current form, the APRM will reward states that uphold the norms of free markets and 
democratic policies. Leaders found in violation of these norms will undergo a process of 
"constructive dialogue" with their African peers in an effort to rectify the situation. 79 Peer 
review criteria will be based on governance norms and democratisation goals to which African 
leaders have committed themselves. Crucial to the effectiveness of the mechanism is the 
agreement by both sides of objective criteria for judging adherence to NEPAD's "good 
governance" commitments. These have recently been agreed at the Summit in Rwanda's capital, 
NEPAD, 2002, paragraph 81, www.dfa.gov.za 
'Africa to Review 16 Nations' Governance by 2006'. =="", Kigali. February 14.2004 
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Kigali in February 2004. It is still undecided whether and how African states will impose 
sanctions on wayward states that fail to come into line after the process of "constructive 
d· 1 " 80 la ogue . Currently, the document does not suggest any punitive sanctions for NEPAD 
against wayward governments. This is a contentious issue and one that is particularly important 
to the success of NEPAD. 
The APRM derives from the controversial concept of a 'partnership' between Africa and the 
developed states. Problems arise over how exactly this partnership is defined and where the 
emphasis lies. The term 'partnership' has become a vogue word in the domain of international 
co-operation. It conveys a relationship stronger than what is implied in the term 'co-operation' 
and weaker than what is implied in the term 'compact'. It implies the existence of 
interdependence. However, the economic growth model upon which the prevailing development 
thinking is largely founded is characterised by the domination of the strong over the weak and a 
drain of resources from the poor to the rich nations. 
In effect, NEP AD's . partnership , rests on the idea of a trade-off, where African leaders will hold 
each other politically and economically accountable for responsible governance, and in exchange, 
the industrialised powers are asked to make commitments on greater ODA flows, foreie,Tfl direct 
investment, market access for African goods, and debt relief and cancellation. The 08 has 
stressed that its resource commitments depend on the commitment of African governments to 
pursue political democratisation and free market strategies and to uphold their commitments to 
economic and political refonns. 81 In particular, its support hinges on Africa's demonstrated 
commitment to good governance and the rule oflaw, human investment, poverty reduction, and 
economic growth policies. 82 African leaders have emphasised that fulfilment of NEP AD's goals 
by African states is dependent on the speedy provision of material benefits promised by the 08 
and other donors in the fornl of aid, investment and debt relief. Whether or not the needs of both 
parties can be met depends on the success of the APRM. 
The APRM offers the chance to test the nature of this 'new partnership'. It seeks to offer a 
means to move away from donor driven conditionalities or "donor democracy" and to introduce 
7<) NEPAD. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). 2002. paragraph 24. www.dfa.gov.za 
XII NEPAD. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). 2001. paragraphs 1.5. "Stages of the Peer Review 
Process". www.dfa.gov.za 
SI GS Africa Action Plan, paragraph 7, Government of Canada . .!.!..!!'-'-'-"~~'" 
GS Africa Action Plan, paragraph 4. Government of Canada . .:..:...:..!-'-'-'-'=== 
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the idea of mutual accountability. If successful, the claim to partnership will be strengthened, as 
will NEPAD. However, if Africa is seen to be undertaking political and economic directives 
dictated by the West or if the West fails to come up with tangible benefits that demonstrate it is 
fulfilling its side of the partnership, the concept will be invalidated and NEPAD seriously 
weakened. 
Several sizeable obstacles, not least mistrust based on historical realities, threaten the APRM. 
NEP AD is not the first initiative to structure itself on the basis of reciprocal promises of reform 
by African governments in return for aid and investment from donors. It follows from a series of 
efforts that have been marked by broken promises, contradictory policies, and non-compliance by 
donor governments and African leaders. Africa's slate is tainted by repeated violations of 
democratic norms and financial mismanagement by African leaders. This plays an important role 
in the West's scepticism of NEPAD, especially regarding the commitment of some of Africa's 
leaders to political and economic 'good governance'. Africa's belief in the West's commitment 
to increasing market access to assist in its development is also marred by doubt. This is 
exacerbated by the high tariffs presently imposed, particularly by the European Union and the 
US, on African agricultural products and by their controversial dumping of agricultural surpluses 
in Africa, which have distorted the latter's domestic markets and negatively affected the profits 
of African farmers. The current international political dynamic has also raised doubt over the 
ability of the G8 to fulfil its pledges to NEPAD, given competing demands on resources, coming 
most notably from America's War on Terrorism. 
Another important doubt over the APRM derives from the contradictory aims of the African 
states and the donor governments. For African states the objective is that the APRM is African 
led, managed and owned, serving African interests in accordance with NEPAD's aims as 
described in its introduction. Conversely, donor states place the emphasis on pulling those 
African states that deviate from donor interests into line. This leads to concern that external 
actors could try and use the APRM to sanction leaders selectively, as some articulate was the 
case over Zimbabwe. The alarm here is that the APRM could become a means through which 
donors could impose collective penalties on Africa in cases where leaders go against donor 
interests and are not sanctioned by African peers. The concern is that even if African leaders 
may be unwilling to impose politically divisive sanctions on their fellow heads of state, they may 
face insurnlOlmtable pressure by the donors to do this. Such an eventuality would undermine the 
goal of the African development agenda and NEP AD itself. 
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These fears have been fuelled by the Zimbabwe case, where after the March 2002 elections in 
Zimbabwe, US officials and some members of the European Parliament warned that the West 
would not support NEPAD if the leaders of the two African countries, South Africa and Nigeria, 
in the three member Commonwealth committee on Zimbabwe, did not suspend the latter from 
the Commonwealth. In this instance, Mbeki and Obasanjo met the donors' demands and passed 
the suspension after Commonwealth observers submitted a report criticising the elections as 
flawed. For some, this is read as evidence of Africa's vulnerability under NEPAD to Western 
pressure and the lack of depth in NEP AD's claims to be African owned. Following this line of 
argument, NEPAD is accused of being dominated by the OMS agenda and not offering a plan 
significantly different from past development initiatives. 
A major fear is that donor acceptance of the 'partnership' label and the goals of NEP AD may be 
superficial and that beneath the surface the donor community may continue to see the 
relationship between themselves and Africa as a donor-recipient one. These fears have also been 
fuelled by the outcome of the Monterrey UN Conference on Financing For Development, where 
no new or innovative proposals achieved a consensus and where the already discredited HIPC 
initiative was endorsed by the UN, which as touched on earlier, has been interpreted by some as a 
surrender by the UN to the economie neo-liberalism of the IFIs. 
Currently, the APRM is voluntary in that only states that subscribe to it will be subject to its 
rulings. I'D There are now 22 African states84 that have voluntarily agreed to open their financial, 
social and political books to APRM country teams, who check if the states conform to the 
strategic goals of good governance and prosperity, and are free of undemocratic governments and 
conflict. Among the five largest financial contributors to the AU, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria 
and Egypt, have already signed up for peer reviewing, only leaving out Libya. Pressure is 
mounting for the remaining states to sign up. To carry out the process, each signatory African 
member is required to deposit US 100 000 Dollars into the APRM panel's coffers while 
additional funding is planned to corne from the international donor community. Already, scores 
of African leaders, such as former AU chairperson, Joaquim Chissano, have been issued with a 
robust 80-page self-assessment questionnaire from the APRM panel. 
NEPAD. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). 2002. paragraphs 1,S. www.dfa.gov.za 
x~ Figure taken in August 2004 
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Summary 
NEPAD seeks to achieve its varied goals principally through two methods the bargaining and 
co-operation method, and the commitment method. While neither is particularly novel, the 
APRM, in the latter method, is NEPAD's response to try and overcome the problems that have 
underscored the failure of past development initiatives, particularly regarding a partnership 
between Africa and the donor powers. The APRM does theoretically offer a bridge between the 
two conflicting interest groups. However, potential flaws because of its limited means of 
enforcement and donor influence, threaten to weaken the mechanism. Claims of donor influence 
over the APRM also undermine the validity of NEPAD's assertion to be African owned. 
Contrary to this, they fuel the argument that NEPAD tows the DMS agenda. 
(d) The manaeement structure 
African Union 
Implementation Committee 15 members 
(3 representatives from each of the 5 regions) 
Steering Committee - 5 Members 
(South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and Egypt) 
Secretariat 
Task Teams 
NEP AD offers a four-tier management structure as depicted in the box above. The supreme 
authority is the African Union and this body is charged with providing the policy framework. 
Under this is the Implementation Committee, which is constituted by three members from each 
of the five African sub-regions, and it meets every four months to determine policies and 
priorities and approve a programme of action. At the Abuja meeting in October 2001 where 
NEPAD was formally adopted, the decision was taken to create the Implementation Committee 
along geographical lines rather than based on the reformist credentials of the members. This was 
a compromise that not only affects the nature of N EP AD' s implementation but it also holds 
particular sif,rnificance for NEPAD's crucial standards of governance component. The five 
initiating members then make up the level below this known as the Steering Committee. The 
66 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
function of this body is to develop a strategic plan for marketing NEP AD at the international, 
sub-regional, regional and national levels. It seeks to mobilise domestic support and facilitate 
private-public partnerships. South Africa, Algeria and Nigeria, being the three states that guided 
the initial development of MAP, Senegal that proposed the Omega Plan and Egypt that is seen as 
the other major continental power make up this structure, which meets monthly. Below the 
Steering Committee is a small permanent secretariat based in Pretoria, South Africa and led by 
the South African economist and advisor to Thabo Mbeki, Wiseman Nkuhlu. This is divided 
into three work streams: project and programme policy co-ordination; administration and 
secretarial services; and communications and marketing of the plan inside and outside Africa. 
Finally, the NEAPD structure includes five task teams beneath the secretariat, which add to the 
organisational complexity in that they fail to fit directly into the stated initiatives. Existing 
institutions are responsible for managing these task teams. The UN Economic Commission for 
Africa will manage the economic and corporate governance task team. The task team in charge 
of agriculture and market access will be run by the AU; infrastructure by the African 
Development Bank; the central bank and financial standards by the African Development Bank; 
and finally, capacity-building on peace and security, which will include a sub-committee on 
conflict prevention, management and resolution, headed by Mbeki, will be run by the AU. This 
reaffirms that while NEPAD is a new initiative, it is managed by the same organisations and 
figures that have been involved in past efforts. This does not necessarily mean it will follow the 
same path as past initiatives, though it adds to the risk that NEP AD may fall foul to the same 
inadequacies. 
(i) The AU and NEPAD 
There is a complex relationship between the AU and NEPAD. The latter, which grew out of 
earlier OAU-related development programmes, was finalised in 2001, and was formally adopted 
as a core programme of the AU at its inauguration. Its distinguishing features are that: it requires 
urgent action in order to arrest Africa's seemingly inexorable economic and political decline; and 
it needs interlocutors with the industrialised countries who are Africa's intended 'partners' in the 
rescue process. Largely, NEPAD and the AU have been presented as separate initiatives. In 
some respects NEPAD's architects have made a concerted effort to distance their plan from the 
AU. The creation of a separate set of institutions for the governance and promotion of NEPAD, 
particularly the establishment of a separate NEPAD secretariat in Midrand, South Africa, 
reinforces the impression of distinct, if not divergent, institutional frameworks, even though 
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these arrangements were formally mandated by the AU. This is likely to be a result of NEP AD's 
efforts to attract foreign support. The rationale is that because of the DAU's past failings, the 
flow of funding is likely to be greater if NEPAD is seen as separate to the AU, which, as 
mentioned earlier, only recently replaced the DAU. However, it may be argued that the distance 
between the AU and NEPAD is superficial and that in order to further the goal of African unity 
the two may increasingly converge. Ambassador Said Dj innit makes the point that "a strategic 
continental undertaking such as NEPAD could not be situated outside the DAU/AU, the premier 
continental and legitimate institutional framework.,,8s Importantly, they share goals. In 
particular, NEPAD's aim for African development and a new partnership between African 
governments and its peoples are also central to the AU's objectives. Additionally, NEPAD's 
APRM is in line with what is called for by the Constitute Act of the African Union.86 At the 
AU's inaugural summit in Durban, the enlarged Implementation Committee was mandated to 
continue with its efforts and encourage all member states to adopt NEPAD's Declaration on 
Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. It also called for the APRM to be 
located within the AU, as part of the Conference for Stability, Security, Development and Co-
operation in Africa (CSSDCA) process. 
A close alliance between the AU and NEPAD would help the former through enabling it to build 
a track record of development and thus ful til its goals. It would also be in NEP AD's interest 
especially given that many would argue the AU has taken greater care to engage civil society 
than have NEPAD's architects. Compared to relatively little civil society involvement in the 
formation of NEPAD, the process of establishing the AU saw the DAU secretariat hold several 
consultations with civil society groups between 2001 and 2002.87 This gives greater weight to 
the argument that a close alliance between the AU and NEPAD would better enable the latter to 
reach more organisations and to increase its constituency. In so doing, it would also boost 
NEP AD's legitimacy. That the alliance has remained cool and they are seen as separate 
initiatives in the public eye may be taken as evidence of donor influence over NEPAD. 
X< Djinnit. S" 'NEPAD: A View From the African Union', in NEPAD: African Initiative, New Partnership?, 
International Peace Academy Report, July 2002 
X(; Constitutive Act of the African Union, Department of Foreign Affairs, October 2001, article 9 (1). This calls for 
the Assembly of the African Union to monitor and implement policies and decisions of the African Union and to 
ensure compliance by all member states. 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, Department of Foreign Affairs. October 200 L article 23 (2) asserts that any 
member state that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the AU may be subject to sanctions and other 
measures of a political and economic nature, which will be determined by the Assembly. 
Additionally, the Africa Institute of South Africa sponsored a series of meetings on N EPAD in which NGO's were 
involved. 
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(ii) South Africa and NEPAD 
The donor community is not the only dominant force in NEPAD. South Africa also has a 
significant role. As the closest thing Africa has to a superpower and given the limited action by 
the international community, South Africa has become the main actor, real and perceived, in 
resolving Africa's problems. Indeed, as part of Mbeki's African renaissance concept, the South 
African president has actively sought to place South Africa within this role. Although not 
formally articulated until April 1997 in an address by Mbeki to an American Audience88 , the idea 
of an 'African Renaissance' has been a guiding rationale of South Africa's foreign policy since 
late 1996 when Mbeki started to playa more active role in the formulation of Pretoria's foreign 
policy. In 1997 a document entitled 'The African Renaissance: A Workable Dream' was 
published by the Office of the South African Deputy President. This suggested five areas of 
engagement with the African continent: the encouragement of cultural exchange; the 
emancipation of the African woman from patriarchy'; the mobilisation of youth; the broadening, 
deepening and sustenance of democracy and the initiation of sustainable economic development. 
Later, in April 1998 Mbeki expanded, in an address at the United Nations University, on some of 
the central tenets of his renaissance vision. Among them were the needs: to establish and 
maintain systems of good governance; to introduce new economic policies - to attract 
investment, to reduce the role of the state in ownership of the economy, and to build modem 
economies; and to pursue policies to ameliorate education, health care, housing, water and 
sanitation.89 Evidently, there are strong parallels between the goals of NEPAD and those of the 
African Renaissance, spearhead by South Africa. 
The fact that the backing of NEP AD is dominated so much by South Africa and Mbeki 
contributes in some ways to the argument that NEP AD is African owned. However, further 
analysis of Mbeki's African Renaissance reveals that it tends towards the DMS and thus, given 
Mbeki and South Africa's pivotal role in NEPAD, this undermines the claim that the latter is an 
African owned initiative. Mbeki's vision is criticised by many for towing the line with well-
trodden orthodox liberal approaches90 . In particular, Vale and Maseko, in their seminal work, 
'South Africa and the African Renaissance', which divides the thinking on the African 
xx Vale. P .. and Maseko, S., 'South Africa and the African Renaissance', International Affairs, 74, 2, 1998, p.273 
X9 Thabo Mbeki. 'The African Renaissance, South Africa and the world', speech delivered at the United Nations 
University, 9 April 1998 
91J See Nzimande. B .. The Sunday Independent, Johannesburg, 11 July 1999 and Taylor, I., and Williams, P., 'South 
African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African Renaissance meets Vagabondage Politique?' African 
Affairs, 100. 2001, p. 268 
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Renaissance into two camps - Globalists and Africanists, place Mbeki and his African 
Renaissance vision firmly in the Globalist camp. This is characterised by: an acceptance of the 
liberal international economic order within which its advocates seek to integrate Africa, and a 
focus is on economic development, conceived as GDP growth. Such thinking reflects the 
perceived need by many government elites to turn their countries into competition states in the 
expectation of a quid pro quo from the international community in the form of investment, debt 
relief, more favourable trade policies and market access, and assurance of a stronger position 
within the global economic and political system. It is based on the energetic promotion of the 
liberalisation of markets, trade and polyarchic institutions across Africa. 
Vale and Maseko describe Mbeki's African Renaissance as: 
"a continental effort led by South Africa to advance the familiar 'end-of-history' thesis ... .In 
exchange for acting as the agent of globalisation, the continent will offer South Africa a 
preferential option on its traditionally promised largesse of oil, minerals and mining.,,91 
They describe that "many believe that the African Renaissance is no more than an effort to secure 
non African (particularly US) interests in the African continent.,,92 They see South Africa as 
comfortably settled into a post-Cold War era in which neo-liberal hegemony has been reasserted 
largely via President Clinton's geo-economic strategy, which Michael Cox describes as designed 
to create an environment where democratic capitalism can flourish within a world where the US 
remains the dominant actor.93 Taylor and Williams support this thesis, arguing that "Mbeki's 
prescriptions clearly reflect the orthodox view in both contemporary development discourse and 
international relations ... [his] government not only accepts the premises of this project but also 
endeavours to promote it in Africa through the notion of the African Renaissance.,,94 Fantu 
Chern also sees Mbeki's vision as reflecting the arguments made by "the World Bank and other 
donors who would like to see South Africa take the leading role to facilitate collective economic 
liberalisation across the region by improving conditions for a more active role by private 
agents,,9). Mbeki's statement on 3rt! June 2003, following the G8 Summit in Evian, in which he 
91 Vale. P., & Maseko. S .. 'South Africa and the African Renaissance', International Affairs, 74, 2,1998, pp.278-9 
llc Vale. p" & Maseko, S., 'South Africa and the African Renaissance'. International Affairs, 74, 2,1998, p.28 
q1 Cox, M., US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Supemower Without a Mission? Printer/RIIA, London, 1995, p.5 
'I,) Taylor. I., and Williams, P., 'South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African Renaissance meets 
Vagabondage Politique?' African Affairs, 100,2001, p.270 
'l< Fantu C, 'Civil Society and political economy in South and Southern Africa' in Gill, S., (cd.), Globalisation, 
Democratisation and Multilateralism., Macmillan, Basingstoke. 1997. p.239, cited in Taylor. L and Williams. P., 
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chose to emphasise donor concerns that, prior to the commitment of further funds, evidence was 
required of Africa's capacity to implement infrastructural projects (especially water supply) and 
deliver health and education services, further supports this view. In this instance, demands that 
G8 leaders disburse more of the additional 6 billion dollars per year, which was promised at 
Kananaskis, and act quickly to tackle agricultural subsidies were most vehemently articulated by 
organisations such as Oxfam and ActionAid, which intensively lobbied G8 nations prior to the 
summit. Such a reading further disproves NEPAD's claim to be African owned and instead adds 
weight to the argument that it tows the DMS line. 
NEPAD's claim to be African owned is also undermined by the fact that even among African 
heads of state NEPAD has only gained nominal and shallow support. Thabo Mbeki is the only 
one to have spent significant time and energy promoting the plan. Noteworthy fissions are also 
appearing between Mbeki and other member representatives, particularly Obasanjo, regarding 
reform, corruption and governance. Many African states are excluded and even among those that 
are included there are significant differences in their vision of development, which may have 
serious implications for the success of the plan, especially its cornerstone - the APRM. 
Generally, small and medium-sized African nations are suspicious of the dominance of Nigeria 
and particularly South Africa. They fear that NEPAD's major beneficiaries will be the continent's 
two largest economies, which are the hubs of its principal mineral-industrial complex and oil-
producing sector, and the loci of many G8 strategic and investment interests. Without all African 
countries being involved and with support made shallow through differences in development 
agendas, NEPAD's claim to be African owned is diluted. 
The validity of NEP AD's claim to be African owned is also challenged by the lack of 
involvement by civil society. It is openly admitted that consultation within Africa and among 
African parliaments has been weak relative to efforts to entice Western donor support. NEP AD 
presently falls short of adhering to the popular participation / democratisation of the development 
process tenets of the indigenous development agenda, instead pursuing a DMS driven focus 
where the priority has been to attract support from the major IFIs and donor countries. The 
architects of NEPAD have focused their energies largely on selling NEPAD to the developed 
world and little attention has gone to finding African support. They are criticised for engaging in 
the design behind closed doors and failing to adequately cater for civil society and national 
'South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African Renaissance mects Vagabondage Politique?' 
African Affairs, 100. 2001, p.270 
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African parliamentary consultation and participation. Consequently, civil society actors have 
taken objection to what they see as the elitist nature of the process in which a top-down approach 
by leaders has been employed rather than a bottom up approach by the people. 
Summary 
NEPAD's management structure is here taken to demonstrate that the plan only responds to past 
failures with limited novelty. Especially, given that it is managed by the same organisations and 
figures that have been dominant in past initiatives, it does not stand as radically different to what 
has gone before it. Further, while the dominance of South Africa and Mbeki may at first 
impression indicate the plan is African owned, under deeper analysis, it acts to debase such a 
claim because of South Africa and Mbeki's tendency to ally with the OMS agenda and because 
of limited support by other African states. In addition to the fact that not all states are included, 
even among those that are involved, differing development agendas obstruct the depth of support 
for NEPAD. The influence of the DMS in NEPAD's management structure is also evident in the 
relationship between the AU and NEPAD. That the two are marketed as distanced is taken as an 
indication of pandering to the DMS in order to be better positioned to gain FOI and aid. 
Section Conclusion 
NEP AD may be seen in many ways as a culmination of previous development initiatives and an 
attempt to address the weaknesses of them. It builds on past initiatives such as the LP A or the 
UN-PAAERD by placing greater emphasis on issues such as democracy and governance. lJN-
P AAERD fell short in this regard by skirting over these issues by, for example, defining the 
intensification of the democratisation process as related to popular participation. NEPAO also 
places greater emphasis on the need to address issues of compliance and enforcement of treaties 
and declarations by African leaders. However, NEP AD is largely managed by the same 
organisations and figures that have been involved in past development efforts and in this regard 
its ability to effectively respond to past failures may be limited. In its methods too, NEPAD does 
not propose to break from past efforts, though the APRM does take the pursuit of a partnership 
between Africa and the donor powers, based on a trade off of interests, a step further. It is 
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important to consider though that the effectiveness of this mechanism may be limited because of 
its enforcement and compliance constraints. 
While NEP AO is officially a home grown initiative and while South Africa and Mbeki have been 
pivotal in its creation and management, it could be argued to be more a South African plan than 
an African one. Not all African countries are included and besides South Africa's involvement, 
commitment has been limited. Also, South Africa's role does not necessarily give credence to 
the claim that NEP AO is truly African owned as there is ample weight behind the opinion that 
Mbeki's South Africa is heavily influenced by the OMS. 
Like African development initiatives beforc it, NEPAO places emphasis on self-reliance, 
regional integration, partnership, popular participation and respect for human rights and in this 
way it is representative of the African development agenda. However, in other ways, such as its 
limited civil society involvement, NEP AD diverges from the African development agenda. 
Further, while in some ways NEPAD is representative of the African development agenda as it 
claims, in other ways it allies itself with the OMS. 
The current international political system is constituted by the vested interests of states and the 
dominance of the economic superpowers, especially the US, which consequently also constitute 
the main beneficiaries of the world 'system'. In contrast, weaker states especially in the third 
world arc 'system dependent', having very limited control over the world 'system' in which they 
must survive.96 Thus, they are subject to pressure to conform to the OMS interests. 
The OMS agenda does not necessarily or in all aspects run counter to the African development 
agenda. However, the problem lies in the difference in priorities. While the vested interests of 
the Bretton Woods institutions and the leading Western governments are the priority of the OMS, 
the indigenous African development agenda is motivated by the priority of African governments' 
interests. This creates a paradox where the donor countries may want to help Africa out of its 
development crisis, but not to their own disadvantage. 
This contradiction plays itself out clearly in trade discussions, as in the Ooha round of the WTO, 
where the developing countries have been pushing for fairer access to foreign, especially 
tJ(; Schrire. R, A .. 'Globalization and the State: A View from the South', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 
14.2000. pp,49-66, 
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European and American, markets in order to lift them out of poverty. Although, it can be argued 
that the European countries and the US are sympathetic to the ultimate goal of reducing poverty, 
they continue to fall short of reducing trade barriers and domestic grants that make it 
uncompetitive for developing countries. 
One of the most controversial aspects of NEPAD is its reliance on the donor community. 
NEPAD has attempted to negotiate with Northern powers the terms of Africa's integration into 
the world economy without challenging the systemic and structural dynamics by which 
globalisation has further marginalised Afriea and created polarisation both within and between 
African countries.97 Thus, it places a strong focus on attracting FDI and aid, economic growth 
and better integration within the world economy, all of which indicate the pervading influence of 
the OMS agenda. 
NEPAD generally adheres to neo-liberalism and the two-gap model of development. It is 
founded on the belief that more aid and freer trade will flow to Africa. Its vision sees poverty 
eradication as dependent upon the rise in GOP to 7% per annum, requiring an inflow $64 billion 
of resources per year, which constitutes 12.75% of Africa's total gross national income per year. 
Equally, the amount needed, according to NEPAD, amounts to more than the total world wide 
aDA flows. NEPAD's main solution to the foreign investment drought is the promotion of a 
foreign stake via public private partnerships in privatised infrastructure. This has brought much 
criticism to the initiative, especially from Labour Unions and the left. By using such strategies 
NEPAD offers little to help Africa become self-reliant in financing. In this way, NEPAD 
contradicts the indigenous development agenda of self-reliance and self-sustainment. At the 
African Social Forum meeting in Mali in January 2002 most participants of the group rejected 
NEPAD because of the neo-liberal framework in which it was drafted. 98 At the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in August and September 2002, protesters took to 
the streets in opposition to NEP AD for this reason. 
More than past development initiatives NEPAD, and particularly its APRM, brings convergence 
between the OMS and the African development agenda closer. However, the OMS and the 
African development agenda are conflicting animals in that each has their own agenda with 
Presentation to the Trade Strategy Group Workshop, 'Nepad and Globalisation: Some Initial Thoughts', 
Alternatives. Alternative Information and Development Centre, Vol. 2, No.2, South Africa, p.2 
9X Alternatives, Alternative Infonnation and Development Centre, Vol.2, No.2, South Africa, p.7 
Also see African Social Forum. The African Social Forum Report, Bamako, Mali. 9 January, 2002 
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differing priorities. This highlights the problem inherent in NEPAD, whereby conditions, based 
on donors' selectivity, according to the priorities of globalisation, are attached to resource 
provisions in the APRM. 
Further, even if the APRM were to succeed in gaining support for NEPAD, the plan itself will 
arguably face insurmountable odds to succeed in addressing Africa's development dynamic. The 
APRM is a step in the right direction but even beyond remedying Africa's internal problems, 
external factors, most notably unequal terms of trade, still need to be redressed. 
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Final Conclusion 
The African continent currently constitutes what may be described as a development crisis. 
Following the high hopes of anti-colonial struggles, Africa remained economically and politically 
subordinate in the international political system, and its economy underwent decline. A variety 
of internal and external factors including terms of trade, market forces, debt, corruption and poor 
governance explain this. 
A series of donor-led and African-initiated development plans have sought to reverse this decay. 
In theory, the summarising comparison of these two groups of development plans may at first 
thought be expected to read: the donor-led plans essentially advocate OMS interests while the 
African plans promote the African development agenda. However, in reality, and as this work 
explains, the analysis is more complex, particularly because the OMS has a pervading influence 
even in the African-initiated efforts. 
The World Bank plans, which have historically been dominant in seeking to address African 
development, have made noteworthy efforts to take account of the need for a greater focus on 
poverty alleviation. However, they fundamentally remain driven by the OMS and primarily serve 
its interests. The World Bank's particularly influential SAPs, which were initiated in the 1980's, 
and which have been grounded in neo-liberal thinking, have been subject to strong criticism. As 
well as failing to address the link between income deterioration and corruption, one of their main 
failings in furthering African development has been their avoidance of addressing the causes of 
inequality and economic dependence, particularly the issue of unequal tenns of trade. This has 
been an oft-repeated shortfall in Africa's development efforts and suggests the influence among 
them of the OMS. The diminishing role of the state, inherent in the ascendance of neo-liberalism 
and a prime effect of SAPs, has also had a destructive effect on African development indicators, 
especially regarding education and health services. Thus, despite and as a result of SAPs, Africa 
has been confronted with increased impoverishment. 
The World Bank's effort to redress criticism has come in the fonn of post-modernist infiltration 
into its discourse. Although this has allowed for a greater stress on commitment to poverty 
alleviation, post modernism's characteristic avoidance of causal analysis, solution finding and its 
focus on deconstruction of theory has not served to offer any significant change to the World 
Bank's Africa focused development policies. Rather, it has served more as a tool, which remains 
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in the OMS interests, to deflect criticism away from much needed criticism of neo-liberalism, 
specifically with regards to Africa's development policies. 
The series of UN development efforts for Africa, which are marked by a distinctive emphasis on 
'partnership', have also failed to break out of the neo-liberal paradigm. Further, its plans have 
essentially not succeeded in bridging a compromise between Africa and the donors or 
significantly lifting Africa out of its development plight. 
The numerous home grown African development initiatives, with their tendency to focus on 
tenets of the African development agenda self reliance, self-sustainment, economic growth, 
democracy, good governance, human rights, popular participation, and partnership - have met 
with their own set of problems and criticism. From within, Africa has faced the obstacles created 
by poor governance, corruption, limited political will, restricted capacity, and unstable and 
externally dependent economies. By and large, the initiatives themselves have also failed to 
provide the necessary programmes and resources for implementation. External forces, most 
notably unequal terms of trade, have also played their part in limiting African development 
efforts. Further, the failure of African development initiatives can be linked to the influence of 
the OMS. On the one hand, disappointment has come from not ceding enough to OMS interests 
to secure support, and on the other hand, from criticism for towing the OMS line and thereby 
pursuing a development paradigm that places African priorities as secondary to donor interests 
and not raising sufficient domestic commitment. 
NEP AO has partially responded to the failures of past development initiatives, by placing greater 
emphasis on issues such as democracy and governance, by taking the concept of a partnership 
between Africa and the donors further through the APRM, and by offering a more 
comprehensive plan that better provides for implementation. However, it falls short of offering 
anything radically novel. It is largely managed by the same organisations and figures that have 
been involved in past development efforts, it does not pursue any radically different methods, its 
ability to bring wayward states into check remains limited by enforcement and compliance 
constraints, and it is heavily influenced by the OMS. 
The African development agenda is strongly evident in the policies and goals of NEPAO, in that 
the plan promotes in varying ways and to different extents: self-reliance, regional integration, 
partnership, popular participation and respect for human rights. However, the influence of the 
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OMS can be drawn out through the fact that it does not challenge the systemic problems that can 
be a least partially accountable for Africa's underdevelopment and it places a strong focus on 
attracting FOI and aid, economic growth and better integration within the world economy. This 
thrust towards raising significant foreign generated resources for NEP AD works against the 
African development goal of making the continent self-reliant in financing. While South Africa 
has a prevailing role in driving the plan, this in itself can support the argument that OMS 
interests' underpin it, as Mbeki's and South Africa's interests are served by adhering to the OMS. 
The influence of the OMS is also apparent in the fact that conditions, through which donors' can 
selectivity assert their interests, are attached to the provision of resources in the APRM. OMS 
clout in NEP AD debases its claim to be African owned and managed, and to be truly driven by 
the African development agenda and by the priorities of African development needs. This also 
helps to explain the limited support for the plan within Africa, a fact that further weakens its 
claim to be African owned. 
That the international political system is characterised by the dominance of the powerful states 
and institutions, which also constitute the principal beneficiaries of the 'system', validates the 
thesis that the OMS and the African development agenda are essentially incompatible. Unless 
Africa can strengthen its position within the international political system so as to promote its 
needs as a priority above those of the donor states or unless the OMS goes against its realist 
nature and places African development needs above its own, African interests will remain 
secondary to those of the OMS. While the influence of the OMS upon NEPAO may be a forced 
necessity because of the current international political system, it never the less highlights the 
paradox of Africa's development crisis. While African development plans depend on support 
from the donor community because of the imperatives of raising resources that are not accessible 
from within Africa, such reliance undermines the African development agenda and jeopardises 
the priority of Africa's development needs. 
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